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ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AND THE
CIVIL JURY: THE SUPREME COURT'S
ASSAULT ON THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
ROGER W. KIRST t
INTRODUCTION

The decision of the Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission 1 has seriously
weakened the protection afforded by the seventh amendment to the
United States Constitution. 2 In Atlas the Court considered the constitudonality of the enforcement procedure established by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).3 This was the first time
the Court had considered a seventh amendment challenge to recent
statutes in which Congress has expanded the role of administrative
agencies in the enforcement of federal regulatory statutes. 4 The
Court's conclusion that the OSHA procedure is not forbidden by
the seventh amendment constitutes a first round of approval for this
expansion.
The OSHA procedure gives an administrative agency more
power than has been given to agencies enforcing most older federal
regulatory programs. Violations of the Act are not criminal offenses,
and the only sanction is a civil money penalty. Civil money penalties have been used in other regulatory statutes, 5 but OSHA prof Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.S. 1967, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; J.D. 1970, Stanford University.
1430 U.S. 442 (1977). There were no dissents; Justice Blackmun did not
participate in the decision.
2 In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII.
329 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
4 Other examples besides OSHA include the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976) and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-260 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5 For a discussion of various considerations concerning the use of civil money
penalties, see Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil
Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 REcomME DTONS AND REPOaTS oF T=E ADmNSTRATwE

CONFERENCE OF Tm

UNInE

STATES 896 (1973). See generally Abrahams & Snowden, Separation of Powers
and Administrative Crimes: A Study of Irreconcilables, 1 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1 (1976);
Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty
Cases, 59 ComiEYL L. REV. 478 (1974); Gellhorn, Administrative Prescriptionand
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vides a new collection procedure. In earlier statutes Congress had
generally provided for one of two typical collection procedures: if
the agency could enforce payment of a penalty by a denial or withholding of agency permission, the agency did not have to rely on the
federal courts; 1 if Congress wanted the government to be able to
collect the civil penalty with the enforcement powers available for
collecting a court judgment, the agency had to enforce the penalty
by a de novo civil action in federal court.7 Under the enforcement
procedure in OSHA, however, the agency lacks power to collect the
penalty by administrative action alone, and therefore requires some
assistance from the federal courts, but the action is not a de novo
civil action and there is no need to relitigate the violation in district
court.
The petitioners in Atlas challenged this procedure on the
ground that it violated the seventh amendment by using the federal
courts to enforce payment without also providing for a right to trial
by jury. The Supreme Court found no constitutional objection;
in an opinion by Justice White it held that the seventh amendment
did not render the OSHA procedure invalid because there is an
exception for "public rights" cases-"cases in which the Government
sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by
statutes within the power of Congress to enact." 8 That conclusion
alone reduced the reach of the seventh amendment because the
public rights exception had never before been explicitly recognized.
The significance of the Atlas decision extends beyond the
OSHA procedure because the opinion appears to mark the start of a
new approach to seventh amendment interpretation. Atlas is the
seventh in a current *series of decisions interpreting the seventh
amendment, 9 but the analysis in Atlas does not follow the pattern of
the other recent decisions. There is no attempt to follow the classic
Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. 265; Comment, OSHA Penalties: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 10 IDA.so L. REv. 223 (1974); Comment, The Imposition of Administrative Penaltiesand the Right to Trial by Jury-An Unheralded
Expansion of Criminal Law?, 65 J. CarM. L. & C. 345 (1974); Note, 7 SEToNr HALL
L. REv. 458 (1976).
6 An example is the immigration statute considered in Oceanic Navigation
Steam Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909), discussed in text accompanying notes
85-91 infra.
7 Coldschmid, supra note 5, at 907.
8 430 U.S. at 450.
9 The other six were Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (landlordtenant disputes in the District of Columbia); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974) (damage suits under the Civil Rights Act of 1968); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970) (stockholder derivative actions); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1966) (bankruptcy court); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962)
(complex actions and masters); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959) (equitable cleanup doctrine).

1978]

ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AND THE CIVIL JURY

1283

doctrine that the scope of the seventh amendment is determined by
reference to the common law of 1791.10 Instead the opinion relies
on Supreme Court precedents no earlier than 1856 to determine the
correct interpretation of the seventh amendment, which is unusual.
Moreover, the Court does not confidently assert that the cases from
1856 to 1977 accurately reflect the correct reading of the seventh
amendment.
Atlas indicates that the Court is seeking more flexibility in the
interpretation of the seventh amendment and is concerned that a
strict interpretation will "choke the already crowded federal courts
with new types of litigation" that would be better handled by "administrative agencies with special competence in the relevant
field." 11 At the same time, however, the opinion indicates the
Court is uneasy about an interpretation of the seventh amendment
that would severely limit the protection of a guarantee found in the
Bill of Rights. The burden of proceeding to demonstrate either
that the earlier precedents were wrong or that the current Court is
misreading the precedents is placed on the advocates of jury trial.
In Atlas the petitioners did not convince the Supreme Court of
either proposition, but the Court left open the possibility that further research and evidence might require the Court to reconsider
12
its conclusior that the seventh amendment can be read less strictly.
This Article will examine the Atlas opinion and the relevant
history of the seventh amendment. The history is particularly important because Atlas demonstrates how easily a modern court can
misinterpret the amendment if the analysis begins in the middle of
the historical development. Section I analyzes Atlas at greater
length. Section II discusses whether the seventh amendment can
correctly be read as including a public rights exception. Section III
considers the possibility of interpreting the Atlas decision to obtain a civil jury trial in an OSHA case by a procedure not discussed
in Atlas. Section IV discusses the direction that this part of the
seventh amendment debate may take in the future.
I. THE Atlas OPINION
The petitioners in Atlas and in FrankIrey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, its companion, had been
10 The Court included a perfunctory mention of the classic doctrine, 430 U.S.
at 449 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830)), but Justice
White did not rely on this case in his analysis. For a discussion of this doctrine

generally, see Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57

Mnq.

L. REv. 639, 639-42 (1973).
11 430 U.S. at 455.

12 Id.461 n.16.
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assessed civil penalties by the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRC) for violations of OSHA mandatory
occupational safety standards.' 3 In each case an employee had died
in a work related accident, 14 and the Secretary of Labor had inspected the employers' worksites and cited them for OSHA violations. After proceedings before an administrative law judge and a
review by the OHSRC, Atlas was assessed a penalty of $600, and the
Frank Irey Co., a co-petitioner, was assessed a penalty of $5000.15 A
succinct description of the statutory procedure under which these
penalties were imposed was provided by Justice White in the Atlas
opinion.1 The seventh amendment is involved because "the penalty
1' 430 U.S. at 447.
1- In Atlas an employee died when he fell through an opening in the roof of
an unfinished warehouse. The Atlas Roofing Company, his employer, was cited for
violating OSHA regulations requiring roof openings to l e adequately covered or
railed off. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
518 F.2d 990, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1975)., aff'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
In the companion case, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 51 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir.), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 519 F.21
1215 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commn'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). an employee was hilled when the
side 6f a seven and one half foot trench collapsed onto him. Irey, as his employer,
was cited for a violation of OSHA for failing to slope or shore the sides of the
trench. Id. 1201-02.
-5 430 U.S. at 447-48.
36 The Act created a new statutory duty to avoid maintaining unsafe or
unhealthy working conditions, and empowers the Secretary of Labor to
promulgate health and safety standards. Two new remedies were provided-permitting the Federal Government, proceeding before an administrative agency, (1) to obtain abatement orders requiring employers to
correct unsafe working conditions and (2) to impose civil penalties on
any employer maintaining any unsafe working condition. Each remedy
exists whether or not an employee is actually injured or killed as a result
of the condition, and existing state statutory and common-law remedies
for actual injury and death remain unaffected.
Under the Act, inspectors, representing the Secretary of Labor, are
authorized to conduct reasonable safety and health inspections. .

.

. If a

violation is discovered, the inspector, on behalf of the Secretary, issues a
citation to the employer fixing a reasonable time for its abatement and, in
his discretion, proposing a civil penalty.... Such proposed penalties may
range from nothing for de minimis and nonserious violations, to not more
than $1,000 for serious violations, to a maximum of $10,000 for willful or
repeated violations ....
If the employer wishes to contest the penalty or the abatement order,
he may do so by notifying the Secretary of Labor within 15 days, in which
event the abatement order is automatically stayed. .

.

. An evidentiary

hearing is then held before an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission consists
of three members, appointed for six-year terms, each of whom is qualified
"by reason of training, education or experience" to adjudicate contested
citations and assess penalties ....

At this hearing the burden is on the

Secretary to establish the elements of the alleged violation and the propriety of his proposed abatement order and proposed penalty; and the
judge is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate any or all of these items,
giving due consideration in his penalty assessment to "the size of the busi-
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may be collected without the employer's ever being entitled to a
jury determination of the facts constituting the violation." 17
Neither Atlas nor Irey had been able to convince a court of
appeals that the OSHA procedure deprived the employer of a
seventh amendment right to jury trial. Atlas petitioned for review
from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals; the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the order of the Commission in an opinion that rejected both the
challenge to the factual finding of a violation and the challenge to
the constitutionality of the procedure.' s Irey obtained review of
the order before the Third Circuit. A panel opinion upheld the
OSHA procedure; on rehearing en banc the full court also held the
OSHA procedure was constitutional.' 9 A vigorous dissenting opinion by Judge Gibbons, joined by three colleagues, argued that the
20
procedure did violate the seventh amendment.
In both Atlas and Irey the petition for certiorari raised questions concerning article III and the fifth and sixth amendments, as
well as the jury trial clause of the seventh amendment. 21 The
ness of the employer . . , the gravity of the violation, the good faith of
the employer, and the history of previous violations." . .. The judge's
decision becomes the Commission's final and appealable order unless within
30 days a Commissioner directs that it be reviewed by the full Com-

mission...

If review is granted, the Commission's subsequent order directing
abatement and the payment of any assessed penalty becomes final unless
the employer timely petitions for judicial review in the appropriate court
of appeals . ... The Secretary similarly may seek review of Commission
orders . . . but, in either case, "[t]he findings of the Commission with
respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." . . .If the employer
fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary may commence a collection
action in a federal district court in which neither the fact of the violation
nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be retried. .

.

. Thus, the

penalty may be collected without the employer's ever being entitled to a
jury determination of the facts constituting the violation.
Id. 445-47 (footnotes and citations omitted).
17 Id.

447.

'8Atlas argued that the opening had been covered-by tvo bundles of the
insulation material the employee was putting on the roof; the administrative law
judge had held that the bundles were not "so installed as to prevent accidental
displacement." 518 F.2d at 993.
19 The decision of the Commission was vacated and remanded for further consideration because the administrative law judge had used an incorrect definition of
a "willful" violation; without so holding, the opinion indicated that the violation
was at most "serious," for which the maximum civil penalty was $1000 instead of
$10,000. The Irey superintendent had testified that he thought the trench had been
dug in shale and did not have to be shored; the technical data on the nature of the
soil was unclear. 519 F.2d at 1201, 1206-07 & n.16.
20 519 F.2d at 1219 (Gibbons, Aldisert, and Hunter, JJ., dissenting from en
banc opinion); id. 1226 (Garth, J., concurring in part in Judge Gibbons' dissent).
See also id. 1207 (Gibbons, J., dissenting from panel opinion).
21 1. Whether the procedures set up by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 for administrative enforcement of the Act's civil penal-
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Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the seventh amendment
question. 22 Therefore, the Court in Atlas assumed that the money
penalties were civil and not criminal and did not discuss the separation of powers issue.
Before the Supreme Court, Atlas and Irey argued that suits by
the federal government for a civil penalty were suits for a money
judgment, always considered suits at common law within the meaning of the seventh amendment. 23 Therefore, such a suit in federal
court would be subject to the seventh amendment's guarantee of the
right to trial by jury. Petitioners argued that Congress could not
divide the adjudication, review, and collection powers between the
courts and an administrative agency as it had done in OSHA, because the OSHA procedure deprived a defendant of any chance for
a jury determination whether the Act had been violated.24 Petitioners' brief surveyed the historical evidence in an attempt to
demonstrate that the seventh amendment was intended to require a
jury trial in all civil penalty cases.2
The government presented three arguments in support of the
OSHA procedure: 26 (1) the seventh amendment does not apply to
any kind of action in any forum in which the government is a party;
(2) Congress has discretion to create an administrative procedure to
adjudicate certain cases without a jury trial; and (3) the seventh
amendment is not applicable to OSHA proceedings because OSHRC
is a specialized court of equity under the doctrine of Katchen v.
Landy.27 The Court expressly declined to consider the first proposities and administrative definition of the Act's proscriptions violate Article
IlMand the Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution because the
"civil penalties" and administrative enforcement mechanism are "penal" in
nature and effect but omit the constitutional protections required in penal
proceedings, including trial by jury.
2. Assuming arguendo that such civil penalties and enforcement procedures are civil in nature and effect, whether such procedures deny the
defendant employer his right to jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution.
Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Irey v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir.), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 519
F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975), af'd sub nom. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 2-3, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n.
Both petitioners were represented by the same counsel.
22424 U.S. 964 (1976).
23 Brief for Petitioners at 17, 32-42.
24

Id. 44, 45, 61.
20-31.

25 Id.

26 Brief for Respondents at 17-19.

27 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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tion,28 and the opinion did not discuss the third. The second argument, however, developed the analysis the Court used to sustain the
OSHA procedure.
The Court in Atlas rejected the claim that the OSHA procedure
violated the seventh amendment and stated a new rule to explain
why the right to a jury trial does not apply to administrative
proceedings:
At least in cases in which "public rights" are being litigated-e.g., cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes
within the power of Congress to enact-the Seventh
Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the
factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative 9 forum with which the jury would be incom2
patible.
The public rights rule had to be created to decide the Atlas case; it
is not the holding of any earlier opinion. In the remainder of the
Atlas opinion, Justice White explained the precedents that supported the new rule and rebutted petitioners' specific arguments.
The explanation of the precedents makes clear that the new rule is
a conclusion reached from interpretation of several cases, none
directly on point but all presumably sufficiently relevant to provide
helpful authority. Justice White supported the Atlas rule with two
basic lines of precedent: (1) six tax, tax penalty, and customs and
immigration penalty cases; 30 and (2) excerpts from what is mostly
dicta from five unrelated opinions, including the Court's two most
recent seventh amendment opinions, Curtisv. Loether3 1 and Pernell
32
v. Southall Realty.
28 430 U.S. at 449 n.6. The government's argument was based on semantics,
not precedent, and would have astonished the drafters of the Constitution and the
Bill of Bights. Hopefully it will never be made again.
29 Id. 450 (footnote omitted).
30 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (tax penalties); Lloyd Sabaudo
Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932) (customs and immigration penalty); Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (taxes); Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438 (1929) (dictum on taxes in opinion discussing court of customs appeals);
Oceanic Navigation Steam Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (customs and
immigration penalty); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. 272 (18 How.) 272 (1856) (listed by the Court as a tax case; for a.contrary
interpretation, see text accompanying notes 111-13 infra).
31415 U.S. 189 (1974).
32416 U.S. 363 (1974). The Court also relied on NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), and
Bloch v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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The first line of cases requires the more careful consideration
because it provides the core support for the Atlas rule. Justice
White concluded from the six cases that:
Congress has often created new statutory obligations,
provided for civil penalties for their violation, and committed exclusively to an administrative agency the function
of deciding whether a violation has in fact occurred. These
statutory schemes have been sustained by this Court, albeit
often without express reference to the Seventh Amend33

ment.

That conclusion appeared to refute petitioners' argument that the
government may collect a civil penalty only by a common law action
in a federal court subject to the seventh amendment right to trial
by jury. The Court assumed, without discussion, that such power
in tax, tax penalty, and customs and immigration penalty cases implied power to use administrative factfinding in a broader category
of public rights cases. The Court further assumed, and so stated,
that the earlier decisions that the courts did not have to be involved
in the factfinding process in the first instance supported the proposition that the seventh amendment did not require a jury trial at any
stage of the proceedings.3 4 Neither assumption is self-evident; similarly, the assumption that all six cases correctly interpreted the
seventh amendment is questionable. An analysis of the application
of the seventh amendment to those cases will be developed later in
this Article.3 5
The second line of cases provides even weaker support for the
Atlas rule, because it is primarily based on dicta and observations.3 G
Although these five cases may not support the Atlas rule, they help
explain the reasoning behind the Atlas opinion. The treatment of
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp3" is particularly important.3 8
Although it had been ignored by the Court in seventh amendment
cases for 37 years, the precedent of Jones & Laughlin was revived by
Justice Marshall in both seventh amendment opinions he wrote in
1974-Curtis v. Loether and Pernell v. Southall Realty. In Atlas,
Justice White relied on the interpretation of Jones & Laughlin announced by Justice Marshall in Curtis and Pernell. Justice White
33 430 U.S. at 450.

34Id. 456.
See text accompanying notes 61-114 infra.
36 Id. 456.
37301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38 See 430 U.S. at 453-54.
35
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declared that these 1974 opinions had established the "proposition
that when Congress creates new statutory 'public rights,' it may
assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a
jury trial would be incompatible without violating the Seventh
[Amendment]." 39 This use of Curtis and Pernell provides a clue
to the reasoning of the Justices and indicates an important doctrinal
shift in seventh amendment cases.
The reliance on Curtis and Pernell in Atlas indicates that Atlas

is the next step in the Court's process of reevaluating the recent
seventh amendment decisions. Although both earlier cases held that
a jury trial was required in the particular circumstances, the opinions written by Justice Marshall pointedly discussed issues unnecessary to the particular case. In Curtis, Justice Marshall rejected the
claim that Jones & Laughlin had established that all new statutory
rights were outside the scope of the seventh amendment, and explained that Jones & Laughlin "merely stands for the proposition
that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings." 40 That statement was sufficient to explain
the inapplicability of Jones & Laughlin to the Curtis facts, an action
in federal district court for damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1968. Justice Marshall did not stop there, but went further, and
described Jones & Laughlin and other cases as "uphold[ing] congressional power to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized court of equity free from the strictures
of the Seventh Amendment." 41

Two months after the Court's decision in Curtis, Justice Marshall repeated the dictum in Pernell, and expanded the interpretation of Jones & Laughlin. After several pages of historical analysis
establishing that a landlord-tenant eviction action in the District of
Columbia was a suit at common law within the meaning of the
seventh amendment, Justice Marshall considered the reasoning of
the court of appeals in the decision below. The lower court had
interpreted one precedent, Block v. Hirsh4 2 as establishing that no
landlord-tenant suit is within the scope of the seventh amendment
because Block had upheld the constitutionality of a rent control
commission. Justice Marshall found the circuit court's reasoning
incorrect because the suit in Pernell was in the superior court, not
before a commission, and "Block v. Hirsh merely stands for the
principle that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in
39

Id. 455.

415 U.S. at 194.
41 Id. 195.
42256 U.S. 135 (1921).
40

See notes 116-32 infra & accompanying text.
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administrative proceedings . . . . 43 That discussion and the
preceding historical analysis was more than sufficient to support the
conclusion that a jury trial was required in the superior court, but
the opinion included further dictum: "We may assume that the
Seventh Amendment would not be a bar to a congressional effort
to entrust landlord-tenant disputes, including those over the right
to possession, to an administrative agency." 44 Congress had not
taken that possible step; nevertheless Justice Marshall included this
advice on how to evade the seventh amendment.
For four years the dicta written by Justice Marshall in Curtis
and Pernell has invited a response, but no commentator has challenged the assumption that Congress may so easily substitute factfinding by an administrative agency for trial by jury. The use of this
dicta in Atlas to support the newly created public rights exception
requires that it be ignored no longer; the opinions of Justices White
and Marshall implicitly request further analysis.
The pattern of Curtis, Pernell, and Atlas suggests that at least
Justices White and Marshall believe that serious review of the
recent trend of seventh amendment cases is called for. Five of the
six cases prior to Atlas held that a jury trial was required; 45 only
in Katchen v. Landy 46 did the Court hold that an action was not a
suit at common law within the terms of the seventh amendment.
The effect of the other cases was necessarily an increase in the
number of cases in which a jury could be demanded as a constitutional right by civil litigants. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover 47 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood 48 held that the merger of law
and equity could have the effect of permitting a litigant to demand
a jury trial on legal issues which previously would have been tried
without a jury because of the equitable cleanup doctrine. Ross v.
Bernhard 49 held that a jury trial could be demanded if the suit
could be handled as a law action, even though the particular
43416 U.S. at 383.
44 Id.
45

Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500

(1959). In the most recent opinion on the right to jury trial, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Marshall, held that there is a right to jury trial for actions under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Justice Marshall discussed only the
statutory issue even though the Fourth Circuit had also found a seventh amendment
right. Lorillard, A Division of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 98 S.Ct. 866 (1978).
46382 U.S. 323 (1966).

47359 U.S. 500 (1959).
48 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
49396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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mechanism through which the suit was presented had been developed by the equity side and considered equitable. Then Curtis
held that new actions created by Congress would be within the scope
of the seventh amendment if the statute created legal rights and
remedies enforceable by an action for damages in the federal district
court.60
The cases from 1959 to 1974 interpreted the seventh amendment in a manner that produced a ratchet effect on the requirement
of a civil jury. The number and type of cases requiring a jury
were always increased, never decreased, as the merger of law and
equity and improvements in civil procedure made an adequate
remedy at law possible in a greater proportion of cases. During the
same years the use of the jury in civil cases came under serious
attack by commentators and judges.61 The opinions in Curtis and
Pernell may reflect the concern of the Court, or at least that of
Justice Marshall, that it was expanding the scope of the seventh
amendment at a time when many powerful voices were calling for
the elimination of the civil jury or at least its curtailment. Curtis
and Pernell reflect an awareness of the divergence between the
Court's opinions and legal commentary. The dicta appears to be
a tentative search for a way, short of amending the seventh amendment, to reverse the earlier trend and restrict the use of the civil
jury, if contemporary needs made that the best public policy. The
dicta thus suggest a rationale that would permit Congress to counter
the trend of the Supreme Court's opinions. Congress could, for a
class of cases not yet defined, create an adjudicatory body not subject to the seventh amendment, even though in most other respects
it resembled a court. Presumably other constitutional guarantees
would still apply to that body, so that it would have to afford due
process and not conflict with the separation of powers limits of
article III.
t0 415 U.S. at 194.
5
1 E.g., Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be Abolished, 60 A.B.A.J. 570
(1974); Landis, jury Trials and the Delay of justice, 56 A.B.A.J. 950 (1970);
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 502-08 (1975); Steuer, The
Case Against the jury (A Brief Without Citations), 47 N.Y.S. B.J. 101 (1975).
See also Schaefer, Is the Adversary System Working in Optimal Fashion?, 70
F.ILD. 159, 159-65 (1976); Stanley, The Resolution of Minor Disputes and
the Seventh Amendment, 60 MaRQ. L. REv. 963 (1977).
The attacks were not new, but by 1974 Justice Black, one of the most consistent advocates of jury trial in past decades, was no longer on the Court. See
Green, jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482, 488-94 (1956). Cf.
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FoRDHArm L. REv.
227, 229 n.3 (1973) ("There is no significant pressure to adopt the English
non-jury system [for civil cases] and I do not advocate it.").
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Justice Marshall's stated assumption in Pernell seemed to fit the
facts of Atlas very well; the absence of any response to the assumption allowed Justice White to take the next step of converting the
dicta of Curtis and Pernell into the holding of Atlas that Congress
could create an administrative agency to adjudicate OSHA civil
violations without any provision for a jury trial. In Atlas, Justice
White clearly attempted to make the case for eliminating the jury
as strong as the precedents of the last 120 years would allow, but the
opinion itself implies that Justice White recognized that the analysis
supporting the holding was not exhaustive. The opinion, explained
the Court, was following the earlier "holdings or dicta" and the
recent observations of Pernell and Curtis, because "none of the
grounds tendered for so reinterpreting the Seventh Amendment is
convincing." 52
The Atlas Court found three separate arguments raised by petitioners unconvincing. The first was petitioners' historical argument
that some of the early cases had not expressly decided the seventh
amendment issue.53 The point was accurate but not persuasive;
some of the cases did discuss the seventh amendment in upholding
administrative factfinding. 54 The second ground rejected was the
argument that all the precedents dealt "with the exercise of sovereign powers that are inherently in the exclusive domain of the
Federal Government and critical to its very existence" 55-cases involving immigration, customs, and taxation. Justice White rejected
this argument because none of the earlier opinions had stated such a
limitation, and some precedents, such as Jones & Laughlin, were
not within the suggested limitation.5 6 Finally, Justice White discussed the objection that congressional power to require litigation
in an administrative agency would allow Congress to destroy the
right to a jury trial by defining the appropriate forum for the resolution of disputes.57 He found the argument "well put" but "unpersuasive," because Congress could allow administrative factfinding
not covered by the seventh amendment only in "public rights"
cases.55 The flaw in this defense of the Atlas rule cannot be attributed to any particular point in the argument; rather the funda52 430 U.S. at 456.
53 Id.
54

Id.

55 Id.
56 Id.

456-57.

57 Id. 457.
58 Id. 457-58.
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mental weakness is that the defense is nothing more than a collection
of minor points supported by scattered quotations and assumptions.
The conclusion reached in the Atlas opinion reaffirmed that
the Court was not determining all constitutional objections to the
OSHA procedure, but only whether the OSHA statute conflicted
with the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The Court's
conclusion did make clear that the seventh amendment issue had
been decided in accordance with what recent opinions seemed to
indicate was the "settled judicial construction" "from the beginning." ;9 The Court intimated that it might reconsider the wisdom
of the Atlas precedent in a final footnote that declared that "this
Court has the final decision on the question whether a jury is required." 60 Thus, the debate is still alive if additional arguments
are presented and supported by the defenders of the civil jury.
II. Is THERE A

PUBLIC RIGHTS EXCEPTION TO THE

SEVENTH AMENDMENT?

The argument of the petitioners in Atlas that the civil penalty
action created in OSHA was a suit at common law under the seventh
amendment 6 was not supported by any controlling precedent. Instead, the argument rested on the classic constitutional doctrine that
the federal government has three distinct branches, each limited to
the exercise of specifically granted powers. The adjudication of
controversies is vested in the courts by article III, and in civil cases
the federal courts are subject to the seventh amendment. The
OSHA procedure was neither in equity nor in admiralty; therefore
it had to be equivalent to "a suit for a money judgment which is
classically a suit at common law." 62
The Court rejected petitioners' analysis as incomplete because
it did not account for all the methods the government had been
permitted to use to collect the equivalent of a money judgment.
The precedents were interpreted as establishing that the Constitution allowed administrative factfinding and adjudication in tax collection and related cases.6 3 The cases allowed the government to
collect money without a jury and without using any procedure that
resembled a classic suit at common law. Therefore, the Court conr,9 Id. 460.

461 n.16.
61 Brief for Petitioners at 17, 34-38.
60 Id.

62 430 U.S. at 449.

63

Id. 455.
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cluded there was an exception to the seventh amendment for a class
of public rights cases.
The administrative precedents developed in tax, tax penalty,
and customs and immigration cases, however, provide only apparent
support for a public rights exception to the seventh amendment.
When the precedents are traced back to find the authority and
reasoning supporting such administrative factfinding, a single basis
emerges as the foundation of the rules stated in all later cases. That
basis is that taxes were assessed and collected by an executive or
administrative agency without judicial involvement in the colonies
and in England before the adoption of the Constitution and the
seventh amendment, and by the state and federal governments after
1791. The Court assumed that the practice of administrative tax
collection and consistent judicial approval of that practice allows
Congress to authorize administrative enforcement procedures in
other kinds of cases without violating the seventh amendment.6 4
By relying on opinions from 1856 and later, instead of tracing
the tax collection precedents back to 1791, the Court increased the
chance that the interpretation of the seventh amendment would be
inaccurate. Because the Court commenced its historical research in
the middle rather than at the beginning, careful distinctions developed by the earlier judges were not recognized or understood
and overstated dicta were accorded more authority than was proper.
The careless use of precedent permitted the Court to declare that
the cases upholding administrative factfinding in certain situations
subsumed the general proposition that a jury trial is not required
by the seventh amendment in public rights cases. This section will
address three questions: whether the seventh amendment exception
for tax collection can be expanded to include the collection of a
penalty (subsection A); whether the Court correctly interpreted
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.65 as establishing a public rights exception to the seventh amendment (subsection B); and whether the modern dicta have created an exception
to the seventh amendment unknown in 1791 (subsection C).
A. Can Tax CollectionProceduresBe Used to Collect a Penalty?
The constitutionality of collecting federal taxes by nonjudicial
methods is supported by solid authority. The typical eighteenth
century collection procedure allowed the collector to seize or distrain
the property of the tax debtor and then to sell the property to obtain
64

Id. 458-60.

6559 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
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the money to satisfy the taxes; the method was nonjudicial and did
not involve the courts at any stage from assessment to collection.
Collection of a federal duty by distress and sale was authorized by
Congress soon after the United States was formed.6 6 The first exercise of the taxing power, the carriage duty of 1794, provided that
unpaid duties and commissions could be collected either by suit in
any federal or state court, or by distress and sale of the goods and
chattels of the defaulting taxpayer.67 Although the anti-Federalists
brought a test case 1s in an attempt to block Hamilton's plans, there
was no attack on the authority to collect by distress and sale.6 9 Collection by distress and sale was not considered an improper procedure for collection of federal taxes because it had been used since
the Elizabethan poor law of 1601. This procedure was part of the
English land tax of 1689, and it had been used in the colonies as a
70
common procedure.
The often-stated reason for allowing nonjudicial collection of
taxes was the absolute necessity that the government be able to collect quickly the revenue needed for operating; 71 therefore, the
courts did not interfere with the collection by an administrative
agency. Article III did not require collection by the slow processes
of the courts, 72 and the seventh amendment did not apply because
there was no common law action. Fines and penalties need not be
collected so quickly because the purpose of the-fine or penalty is to
control conduct or punish offenses and only more incidentally to
raise revenue. It may be difficult at times to determine whether a
particular exaction is a penalty or a tax, but the distinction must
be made if the seventh amendment is to be correctly applied. In
Atlas the exaction had been labelled a civil penalty rather than a
tax and the court consistently referred to it as a penalty and not
as a tax.
The distinction between taxes and penalties was observed in
the early federal statutes. The first customs acts allowed summary
seizure of goods for non-payment of duties, but penalties could be
6

0E.g., Act laying duties upon Distilled Spirits, ch. 15, § 23, 1 Stat. 199, 204
(1791).
67 Act laying duties upon Carriages for the Conveyance of Persons, ch. 45, § 5,
1 Stat. 375 (1794).
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
69 The government sued to collect the tax by an action of debt, the alternative
method of collection established by the statute.
70 See text accompanying notes 156-229 infra.
7 1
See R. BLAcuwELL, PowER To SEL.L LAND FOR T= NoNPAYMENT oF
T, XEs 29-30 (2d ed. 1864).
72 See Waldron v. Lee, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 323, 327-28 (1827).
68
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collected only by a civil action in a court.7 3 There are no early
federal precedents establishing that Congress cannot use the tax collection procedure to collect a penalty, because Congress never tried
to do so; the statutory provision for a civil action included a statutory right to a jury trial,74 and hence there was no seventh amendment issue.
The application of the seventh amendment was an issue in
proceedings to forfeit property for violations of the federal revenue
laws.75 Forfeiture proceedings were a major source of discontent
in the colonies before the Revolution. In England such matters
were heard by the Exchequer, but there was no Exchequer in the
colonies,70 and the early cases were handled as ordinary civil actions
in the colonial courts with a trial by jury. Often colonial juries
found no violation justifying forfeiture even though the evidence
was clear; eventually the problem became too great to be ignored.
The English solution was to place such cases under the jurisdiction
of the expanded system of vice admiralty courts in which jury trial
was not used.7 7 The absence of a jury in these courts was one of
the major complaints voiced by the colonists.
Colonial history was of primary importance in early Supreme
Court cases determining the proper application of the seventh
amendment to forfeiture proceedings. In United States v. LaVengeance,78 the Court ruled on a forfeiture of a schooner seized for
carrying contraband. The Court held that the forfeiture was in rem
against the property only; the forfeiture did not impose a personal
penalty on the owner,79 so it was a civil action and not a criminal
action. The Court held that an action to forfeit property seized on
navigable water was an action in admiralty. The seventh amend73

E.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 67, 1 Stat. 176 (penalties sued for and
recovered in any court proper to try the same; anything forfeited for nonpayment
of duties to be seized and libeled); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 36, 1 Stat. 47
(same). See also Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, §§ 5, 6, & 10, 1 Stat. 375 (carriage
duty collected by suit in any court or by distress and sale; fines, penalties, and
forfeitures to be sued for in any court).
74
An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, H9 9 &
12, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
75 Much of the historical background is recounted in C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore,
318 U.S. 133 (1943) and People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283,
231 P.2d 832 (1951).
76 The writs of the Court of Exchequer in London did not run in the colonies.
D. CrAi,

THE

RIsE OF

T=E BrnsH TRiAsuRy 174-75 & n.38 (1960).

A separate

exchequer court was never created for the colonies.
77 C. UBBELOHDE, THE VIcE ADmArLTY CouRTs AND THE A_ mncAN REVOLJnON 75-77 (1960); see 4 C. ANDREws, TE COLoNrAL PERIOD OF AmERCAN
HISTORY 168-71, 254-69 (1938).
783 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).
79 Id. 301.

1978]

ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AND THE CIVIL JURY

1297

ment did not require juries for forfeitures in admiralty 0 because
the admiralty exception to the seventh amendment was grounded in
the history before the Constitution and the practice that continued
unchanged after the Constitution. In later cases the Court held
that the admiralty exception would not be expanded to include all
forfeitures; an action to forfeit property seized on land was an action
at common law, subject to the right to trial by jury I" because that
had been the practice in such cases in Exchequer.
The tax collection procedures were not used to collect penalties, 82 and the admiralty exception did not extend to non-admiralty
penalties because there was no history of such practices before 1791.
Thus the early penalty and forfeiture cases affirm that the seventh
amendment guaranteed a jury trial in every action at common law,
unless pre-1791 precedent established an exception for a particular
procedure. There was no procedure in the pre-1791 practice at all
analogous to that in OSHA, so there can be no specific precedent to
support an OSHA exception to the seventh amendment.
Even though there is no specific precedent for an OSHA exception, Justice White upheld the OSHA procedure under a general
public rights exception. Even though there is no evidence that
anyone in 1791 understood there was such an open-ended exception,
several cases were presented in Atlas to support such an exception.
The cases do not establish that the public rights exception ought to
be considered part of the history of the seventh amendment; instead
they show that the 1791 distinction between penalties and taxes has
not always been observed. This has resulted in an expanding number of exceptions to the seventh amendment through misuse of the
tax collection precedents. The customs and immigration penalty
cases on which Justice White relied in Atlas illustrate the erosion of
the seventh amendment by a gradual process in which a combination
of false assumptions, misunderstood distinctions, and inaccurate
dicta resulted in a misinterpretation of the seventh amendment.
The starting point for the trail of false turns was the opinion in
Bartlett v. Kane,83 a challenge by an importer to the administrative
8o Id. See also United States v. Schooner Betsey and Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 443 (1808); United States v. Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406

(1805).

81 United States v. Winchester, 99 U.S. 372, 374 (1879); The Sarah, 21 U.S.

(8 Wheat) 391, 394 (1823) (dictum).
82

See State v. Allen, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 55 (1822)

("tax" of $10,000 on

lottery office held to be a penalty; tax collector prohibited from enforcing his
execution for the tax). Cf. Cowles v. Brittain, 9 N.C. 204 (1822) (sheriff may
use distress and sale to collect penalty of $100 for peddling without a license; the
peddler had refused to pay $10 required for a license).
83

57 U.S. (16 How.) 263 (1853).
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collection of customs duties. The dispute in Bartlett was between
the importer and collector over the value of the imported merchandise; the importer objected to the valuation made by appraisers and sought to have the valuation determined independently
in federal court in an action for refund of duties paid. The appraisers had determined the value of the goods to be more than that
declared by the importer, so that he had to pay duty on the higher
value and an additional twenty percent as a penal duty for the
undervaluation. The importer had not followed the procedure for
review of the appraisal provided by the statute; 84 instead he brought
the action for a refund. The Supreme Court held that the importer
could not obtain a new determination of value in the federal court
action and that the value found by the appraisers was binding. That
result was unexceptional and caused no encroachment on the seventh
amendment, because the appraisers were collecting a federal tax by
an accepted nonjudicial procedure. The goods were concededly
subject to some duty, so the appraisers were acting within their
jurisdiction in finding the value of the goods. The additional duty,
although labeled a penal duty, was not a separate penalty imposed
after separate factfinding, but only an increased duty imposed because the appraisers' valuation was more than 110 percent of the
importer's valuation.
Fifty-six years later the Supreme Court transferred the authority
of Bartlett from the revenue laws to immigration penalties and upheld a procedure that began to undercut the protection of the
seventh amendment. Oceanic Navigation Steam Co. v. Stranahan85
was an action against the collector of customs to recover a penalty
paid for transporting to the United States immigrants who were
afflicted with certain diseases.8 6 The fact of a violation had been
administratively determined by the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor; the penalty had been paid voluntarily, but under protest,
because the collector could not grant a clearance to the steamship
until the penalty was paid. Although other sections of the statute 87
s4 Tariff Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, §§ 16 & 17, 9 Stat. 548.

85214 U.S. 320 (1909).
86The action was brought under the Alien Immigration Act of Mar. 3, 1903,
ch. 1012, 32 Stat 1213.
87The Act included a variety of penalties and procedures. E.g., id. at § 5,
32 Stat at 1214 (civil suit, including private suit akin to breach of contract); id.
at § 18, 32 Stat. at 1217-18 (misdemeanor); id. at § 19, 32 Stat at 1218 (misdemeanor and clearance denied until fine paid); id. at § 38, 32 Stat, at 1221 (fine
and imprisonment); id. at § 39, 32 Stat. at 1221 (fine and imprisonment).
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created fines and criminal penalties that could be enforced only in
the courts, the sanction for nonpayment of the particular penalty for
transporting diseased immigrants was the administrative denial of
8s
clearance.
The opinion of the Court, by the first Justice White, presents a
clear example of misuse of precedent. On the basis of prior tariff,
internal revenue, and taxation cases, Justice White presented the
statement that his successor emphasized in Atlas: "[N]ot only as to
tariff but as to internal revenue, taxation and other subjects [Congress could] impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers
the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking
the judicial power." 89 The first Justice White did not present any
case that upheld the power with respect to "other subjects," and the
second Justice White likewise presents no case to support the broad
assertion made in Oceanic. Neither Justice could do so because
there is no such case. The statement is incorrect or, at best, unsupported dictum, and hardly worthy of emphasis in Atlas to support
that opinion. By using the added claim that the power had been
upheld as to "other subjects," the Court in Oceanic began to transform the limited exception for administrative collection of revenue
into an unlimited exception that could destroy the protection of the
seventh amendment. The Court did not discuss why other cases
might be analogous to revenue cases; the history of the seventh
amendment shows that other subjects cannot so easily be added to
the revenue collection precedents.
In addition to accepting uncritically the dictum of Oceanic, the
Atlas opinion presented the Oceanic opinion as supportive of an
issue the Court had not decided in Oceanic. In Oceanic the penalty
was to be collected by the administrative procedure; however, although the agency could withhold a permit the steamship needed to
operate, it could not affirmatively collect the penalty. Under OSHA
the agency can affirmatively collect the penalty by invoking the
judicial power in a very limited manner. The Oceanic opinion
concluded with the admonition that the Court had considered only
the particular procedure of collection by an administrative denial
of permission to act-in this case for a ship to proceed into portuntil the penalty was paid.90 Therefore, even if it is accepted that
88 Id. at §9, 32 Stat. at 1215-16.
89 430 U.S. at 457 (quoting Oceanic Navigation Steam Co. v. Stranahan, 214
U.S. 320, 339 (1919)) (emphasis added in Atlas).
90
"We have not considered the questions which would arise for decision if the

case presented an attempt to endow administrative officers with the power to
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the procedure upheld in Oceanic is not objectionable under the
seventh amendment, Oceanic does not support Atlas because the
OSHA procedure is substantially different. 91 Nevertheless, Oceanic
is the foundation for the Atlas conclusion that the seventh amendment allows administrative adjudication of civil penalties.
B. The Exchequer Extent and the Public Rights Exception
The earliest precedent used by Justice White to support the
existence of a public rights exception to the seventh amendment
was an excerpt from the 1856 opinion in Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.:
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which
may be presented in such form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of
judicial determination, but which congress may or may not
the courts of the United
bring within the cognizance 9of
2
States, as it may deem proper.

The decision in Murray's Lessee is unassailable on seventh amendment grounds, but it does not support the Atlas rule because it
concerned a fact situation completely unlike that presented in Atlas.
Murray's Lessee involved a very specific procedure for handling
disputes between the Treasury and a federal tax collector; in Atlas,
as often before, 93 the opinion is cited to support the constitutionality
of markedly different procedures. Again the historical research is
important because the history demonstrates that Murray's Lessee
supports only a specific exception limited to its facts; therefore, it is
inaccurate to assume that it is an example of any broader public
rights exception.
enforce a lawful exaction by methods which were not within the competency of
administrative duties, because they required the exercise of judicial authority."
214 U.S. at 343.
91 Oceanic can also be distinguished because it involves only admiralty jurisdiction for which the seventh amendment does not require a jury. Currie, OSHA,
1977 A.B.F. BEs. J. 1107, 1156 & n.245; Note, supra note 5, at 477 & n.116.
The other penalty case cited in Atlas, Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287
U.S. 329 (1932), adds no more authority to the argument. That opinion did not
present a new analysis but simply repeated the prior holding of Oceanic. Again,
as in the prior case, the seventh amendment was not mentioned; only the due
process issue was considered.
Another two of the six core cases contain only dicta that add nothing new.
See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938); Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438, 451, 458 (1929).
92 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856), quoted in Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 451 n.8 (1977).
9
3E.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 589, 596 (1931); Oceanic Navigation Steam Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
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The procedure considered in Murray's Lessee was not an
American invention; it was a development from the English practice
prior to 1791.94 The history of the land tax in England contains
many instances of local collectors who did not promptly account for
the taxes they collected. 95 The central treasury did not bring common law actions to recover from defaulting collectors. The procedure used was the extent, a prerogative process issued from the
court of Exchequer which did not entitle the defendant to the
normal trial by jury found in King's Bench or Common Pleas.9"
The extent was not widely used in England even against defaulting
tax collectors 9 and was not used against taxpayers at all.93
Like the central authorities in England, the colonies had the
problem of collecting the revenue from the local collectors. 99 The
English Exchequer did not exist in the colonies, but early statutes
authorized a process similar to the extent, by which the treasurer of
a colony could issue a warrant to the local sheriff to collect taxes
due from a defaulting collector. 0 0 The authorized means of enforcement was generally distraint and sale of the property of the
collector by the sheriff acting without any judicial involvement.' 0 1
Several early federal statutes also authorized such a process, which
again was nonjudicial and did not involve the courts at all. 10 2 The
question whether such procedures violated the seventh amendment
was not raised in any of the early federal cases, but two early opinions do illustrate the limited reach of the procedure.
94 Much of the history of treasury-collector procedure is recounted in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).

95 See generally W. WARD, THE ENGLISH LAND TAX
CENTURY 30-59, 86-99 (1953).

Ri

=r Ecm'N-rir

96 J. CB-=T, PRERoGATiVES OF THE CROWN AND THE RELATIVE DuTIs
See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
EIGHTS OF = SUBJECT 265-71 (London 1820).

Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277-78 (1856).
97 See W. W~m, supra note 95, at 37, 50, 100-22.

98 The entire collection process was decentralized, so the taxpayer was not a
debtor to the Crown. A debtor of a debtor to the Crown could be proceeded
against by the Crown by an extent in the second degree or by the Crown debtor by
an extent in aid, but there is no evidence that taxes were collected from taxpayers
by this procedure. The power of distress and sale was sufficient. But see Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-96 n.5 (1931) and note 156 infra.
99 See Boyd, The Sheriff in Colonial North Carolina, in Essxys IN Asmncm
COLONIAL HISTORY 400, 409-18 (P. Goodman ed. 1970).
'oo See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 278-79 (1856).
101 See id.
102 See statutes cited at id. 279.
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Ex parte Randolph 103 is valuable because one opinion is by
Chief Justice Marshall sitting on circuit. Randolph had become
acting purser of the frigate Constitution upon the death of the
regular purser. After the ship returned to the United States,
Randolph settled his accounts with the Treasury and received a
discharge of all liability. Five years later the Treasury reopened
the account and found a balance of over $25,000 due from
Randolph. The Treasury then issued a warrant to the United States
Marshal commanding him to collect the amount due by distress and
sale of Randolph's property; if the Marshal could not find sufficient
property he was to imprison Randolph until the debt was paid.
The case came to the circuit court on Randolph's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Marshall noted the objections that
such a process violated article III and the seventh amendment, 1°4
but his opinion did not reach the constitutional question because
the statute did not authorize the Treasury to use summary process
against a person such as Randolph. The "extreme severity" of the
summary process that "departs entirely from the ordinary course of
judicial proceeding" 105 required that the statute be strictly construed. Regular receiving and disbursing officers might properly be
subject to such process because the books of the Treasury would set
out the amount of liability, but that would not authorize such a
procedure in the case of a temporary purser who took over the
accounts of another. Marshall implied that the Constitution would
prevent Treasury adjudication if the statute had attempted to require it, because "such controverted question ought to be decided
in a court of justice." 106
The same statutory process was involved in another opinion of
the Supreme Court, although it did not involve a seventh amendment issue. In United States v. Nourse,10 7 decided by the Court in
1832, the Court discussed judicial involvement in the nonjudicial
Treasury procedure. After Nourse had been removed from an office
in the Treasury, his accounts were examined, and he was found to
owe the United States over $11,000. The Treasury Department
began proceedings to collect the amount due by the summary process
of distress and sale by the Marshal. Nourse pursued the statutory
relief available to him by seeking an injunction from the district
court. The district court referred the accounts to auditors who
10320 F. Cas. 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558).
104 Id. 253-54.
105 ld. 255.
106 Id. 257.
10731 U.S. (6 Pet) 470 (1832).
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found for Nourse; as a result the district judge enjoined the
Treasury from enforcing the warrant. The injunction was affirmed
in the circuit court, but on appeal the Supreme Court held that the
statute did not authorize the Supreme Court or the circuit court to
hear an appeal by the government in such a case. 08 The decree of
the circuit court was reversed, leaving the district court judgment
in force in favor of Nourse.
The United States then sued Nourse in an action of assumpsit
for the same amount. The Treasury Department argued that the
first action had only decided that the government could not resort
to the summary collection process and that it had not decided on
the merits whether the $11,000 was due. The opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall held that the earlier decision by the district court
was res judicata and a bar to any further action by the United
States. 00 Marshall repeated his statement in Randolph that the
courts could not be excluded from the collection process entirely:
It would excite some surprise, if, in a government of
laws and principle, furnished with a department whose
appropriate duty it is to decide questions of right, not only
between individuals, but between the government and individuals; a ministerial officer might, at his discretion, issue
this powerful process, and levy on the person, lands and
chattels of the debtor, any sum he might believe to be due,
leaving to that debtor no remedy, no appeal to the laws of
his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust.
But this anomaly does not exist; this imputation cannot be
cast on the legislature of the United States. While it was
perceived, that the public interest required a prompt
remedy against public defaulters, the legislature was not
unmindful of the rights of individuals . . . .110
In Nourse the appeal from the Treasury to the courts was in
the request for an injunction, and the determination of facts required the settlement of accounts by auditors. Both the complicated nature of the dispute and the remedy sought required equity
proceedings, and hence the common law jury requirement of the
seventh amendment was not at issue. The two opinions of Chief
Justice Marshall in Randolph and Nourse indicate the limited reach
of the transplanted extent under the United States Constitution.
Nonjudicial or administrative procedure was not available except
108 Id. 497.

lo9 United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8, 32 (1835).
11O Id. 28-29.
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against the very small class of regular officials handling government
money, and even for those officials the Constitution might guarantee
some access to the judicial system.
The most important Supreme Court precedent is the 1856
opinion in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co."1
The case did not involve the typical collection from a taxpayer, but
concerned only the procedure used by the Treasury to collect from
the collector. In Murray's Lessee, both parties claimed the same
land under different executions against the original owner, Samuel
Swartwout. 112 The plaintiff claimed the land under a levy of execution on an ordinary judgment against Swartwout. The defendant
claimed under a levy and sale by the Federal Marshal pursuant to a
Treasury distress warrant issued because Swartwout's account was
over one million dollars short. Swartwout was not a party in the
Supreme Court and does not appear to have challenged the finding
of a shortage in his account. The challenge of the Treasury process
was made only by the plaintiff, who was therefore asserting the constitutional rights of the original owner. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Treasury process in an opinion that reviewed
the history of the extent, to demonstrate that Treasury officials could
be distinguished from ordinary taxpayers and subjected to different
procedures outside of the common law courts:
This brief sketch of the modes of proceeding to ascertain and enforce payment of balances due from receivers of
the revenue in England, is sufficient to show that the
methods of ascertaining the existence and amount of such
debts, and compelling their payment, have varied widely
from the usual course of the common law on other subjects; and that, as respects such debts due from such officers,
"the law of the land" authorized the employment of
auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species
of execution bearing a very close resemblance to what is
termed a warrant of distress in the act of 1820, now in
question.
11159 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
112 This is the third appearance of Samuel Swartwout in these cases. Swartwout

was the defendant in Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836).

See

text accompanying notes 246 & 247 infra. After that opinion established the
liability of the collector, Swartwout retained substantial sums of money in order to
be able to repay successful plaintiffs; unfortunately Swartwout became insolvent and
the Treasury was unable to collect all the duties Swartwout had retained. To
prevent a repetition of the Swartwout affair, Congress passed the statute considered
in Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 235 (1845). See text accompanying notes
248-50 infra.
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It is certain that this diversity in "the law of the land"
between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the
colonies and provinces, and more especially of the States,
after the declaration of independence and before the
formation of the constitution of the United States. Not
only was the process of distress in nearly or quite universal
use for the collection of taxes, but what was generally
termed a warrant of distress, running against the body,
goods, and chattels of defaulting receivers of public money,
was issued to some public officer, to whom was committed
the power to ascertain the amount of the default, and by
11
such warrant proceed to collect it. 3

The opinion in Murray's Lessee does not support the proposition that the federal government may substitute administrative tribunals for the article III courts in all cases, or all "public rights"
cases as suggested by Justice White in Atlas. If the sentence from
Murray's Lessee quoted by Justice White in Atlas 114 is interpreted
as establishing a public rights exception, the sentence is dictum unsupported by history; the careful historical analysis presented in
Murray's Lessee compels the conclusion that the Court was not
therein establishing a public rights exception. The entire opinion
shows that the particular procedure in Murray's Lessee was upheld
against the constitutional challenge because there was a clear,
definite, and limited history that a particular procedure had existed
prior to the Constitution and had not been altered by the Constitution. The public official, in accepting the office and trust, accepted
the historical procedure for protecting the government revenue, but
an ordinary citizen cannot be said to have relinquished the constitutional protection afforded by article III courts and the seventh
amendment.
C. The Misleading Authority of Modern Dictum

In addition to the six tax, tax penalty and customs and immigration penalty cases represented by Oceanic and Murray's Lessee,
Justice White summoned five other cases 1 5 to support the argument
that the Court had recognized a public rights exception to the
113 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 278-79.
114 See note 92 supra & accompanying text.
115 Permell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974); NLBB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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seventh amendment prior to Atlas. The two most recent cases,
Curtisv. Loether and Pernellv. Southall Realty clearly provide only.
dicta in support. The apparent support provided by the other three
cases disappears upon a closer reading, because in none of the cases
did the Court specifically uphold any procedure similar to OSHA
against a seventh amendment challenge; if the cases established a
public rights exception they did so only in dicta unsupported by
precedent or analysis.
Justice White uses the opinion in Block v. Hirsh 16 in a manner
that overstates the true holding by Justice Holmes. The authority
derived from Block is summarized in a paragraph quoted by Justice
White in Atlas to emphasize that the Court "squarely rejected" the
seventh amendment challenge:
The statute is objected to on the further ground that
landlords and tenants are deprived by it of a trial by jury
on the right to possession of the land. If the power of the
Commission established by the statute to regulate the relation is established, as we think it is, by what we have said,
this objection amounts to little. To regulate the relation
11 7
and to decide the facts affecting it are hardly separable.
The quotation alone does not explain the reasons for the conclusion
that the seventh amendment does not apply. Justice White attempted to place the quotation in context by explaining that the
challenged statute "temporarily suspend[ed] landlords' legal remedy
of ejectment and relegat[ed] them to an administrative factfinding
forum charged with determining fair rents at which tenants could
hold over despite the expiration of their leases." 118 That description of the statute, while more accurate than the description written
by Justice Marshall in Pernell,129 still does not adequately explain
the Block opinion. The actual holding of Block with respect to the
seventh amendment issue was much more limited than the Court
implied in Atlas.
The statute120 challenged in Block created a rent control plan
for the District of Columbia to deal with the disruption of the hous116 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
117430 U.S. at 452 (quoting Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921))
(emphasis added in Atlas).
118 430 U.S. at 451-52.
119 "[The] statute transferr[ed] actions to recover possession of real property
from the courts to a rent control commission." 416 U.S. at 382.
120 The Food Control and the District of Columbia Rents Act of Oct. 22,
1919, ch. 80, title If, 41 Stat. 297.
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ing market in the District after World War I. As part of the rent
control plan, the statute permitted tenants to hold over, after the
expiration of a lease, at the rent set in the expired lease. The landlord could increase the rent only upon a determination by the
administrative agency that a higher rent would be fair and reasonable. 12 ' In addition, a narrow exception to the hold over right was
created in the statute if the owner wanted to occupy the premises or
planned to tear down the building and rebuild; again the administrative agency determined whether the landlord could obtain possession under that exception. 22 The Court in Block divided five to
four. Both the majority opinion by Justice Holmes upholding the
regulation and the dissent by Justice McKenna focused on the scope
of the police power and the asserted public interest in rents in the
District. Justice Holmes upheld the rent control as a temporary
measure made necessary by an emergency situation. The procedure
was upheld because the Court found it reasonable, in light of the
emergency, to suspend the ordinary remedies.

23

In addition, the rent control statute did not completely suspend
the remedy of ejectment, as stated in Atlas,

24

or transfer actions to

recover possession from the courts to a rent control commission,
as stated in Pernell.25 The administrative procedure was required
for only two issues: rent increases, and owner occupancy or reconstruction. All other issues remained unaffected by the statute, and
could be determined in the usual manner. 12 A tenant who failed
to pay rent had to be evicted in the usual manner, and rent overpayments and underpayments could only be recovered in ordinary
legal actions in the courts. 127 The agency could determine the
accuracy, sufficiency, and good faith of the landlord's notice to
vacate to recover possession for the landlord's own use, but it could
not evict a tenant who ignored a proper notice; the ejectment procedure was still judicial and between private parties. Even the
administrative agency had to employ the courts to collect statutory
121 Id. at §§ 106-08, 41 Stat at 300-02.
122 Id. at § 109, 41 Stat. at 301-02.
123 The Act was emergency legislation that expired at the end of two years.
Id. at § 122, 41 Stat. at 304. "The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary measure. . . . A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may
justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change." 256 U.S. at 157.
124 430 U.S. at 451-52.
125 416 U.S. at 382.
126 The tenant was protected from eviction only as long as the rent was paid
and the conditions of the lease were fulfilled. The Food Control and the District
of Columbia Rents Act of Oct. 22, 1919, ch. 80, title II, § 109, 41 Stat. at 301-02.
The Act did not authorize the commission to hear eviction actions.
127 Id. at §§ 107 & 110, 41 Stat at 300-01, 302.
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penalties from landlords who violated the Act.128 Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court in Block, did not hold that there was no
seventh amendment objection to entrusting landlord-tenant disputes
to an administrative agency. The opinion establishes only that
Congress may constitutionally empower an agency to determine certain facts when an emergency requires the government to regulate
rates. 129 The facts found by the agency could not be relitigated in
a subsequent court action, 13 0 but a judicial proceeding was required
to force a recalcitrant party to act in accordance with any agency
finding; 131 such a proceeding would be subject to the seventh
amendment.
Any appearance that the quotation from Block supports the
Atlas rule disappears when the circumstances of each case are compared. The temporary emergency that was the foundation of Block
is absent in Atlas. The limited role of the rent commission in Block
is not duplicated by the OSHRC in Atlas. Finally, Block hardly
supports the announced rule of Atlas that administrative adjudication is possible when the government sues in its sovereign capacity
to enforce public rights. 132 The government was not a party in
Block; the lawsuit was only between a landlord and tenant.
In a similar fashion, any indication that support for Atlas can
be found in the quotation from Crowell v. Benson133 disappears
upon a closer reading of the case. In a footnote to the Atlas opinion, 34 Justice White conceded that Crowell was not directly on
point, because it involved private rather than public rights. Crowell
was also an admiralty case, and the seventh amendment does not
require a jury in admiralty cases.' 35 Nevertheless, Atlas set out a
Id. at § 112, 41 Stat at 302.
129 Justice Holmes considered the statute as a form of regulation of rates of a
business "clothed . .. with a public interest," 256 U.S. at 155, and therefore valid
under the well established precedent of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 256
U.S. at 157.
130 The Food Control and the District of Columbia Rents Act of Oct. 22, 1919,
ch. 80, title I, § 106, 41 Stat at 300.
131 An appeal to the court of appeals from the commission's determination was
authorized, id. at § 108, 41 Stat at 301, in which the commission's findings were
to be reviewed on the administrative record only and not modified or set aside
except for "error of law." If an owner collected any rent in excess of the amount
fixed by the commission, the commission could recover an amount twice that excess.
The tenant would be returned the excess paid and the balance was to be paid into
the treasury. The doubled amount was similar to a civil penalty; it was recovered
by an action in the municipal court. Id. at § 112, 41 Stat. at 302.
132 430 U.S. at 450.
133285 U.S. 22 (1932).
128

'34

430 U.S. at 450.

135

Id. n.7.
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paragraph of dictum from Crowell that summarized the cases upholding factfinding by administrative agencies, again with emphasis
added to the language that seemed to imply a public rights exception to the seventh amendment. 136 The Court in Crowell, however,
was not interpreting the seventh amendment, because Crowell was
an admiralty case. Of the fifteen cases listed in Crowell,137 only
three can be said to have involved the seventh amendment issue
present in Atlas, and again the three cases were the tax collection
precedents. 13s The dictum in Crowell that Justice White refused to
disregard13 9 in Atlas must be disregarded because it is completely
unrelated to the facts of Atlas. In Atlas the government was attempting to extract money from the citizens as a civil penalty without a jury trial. The prior cases set out in Crowell do not support
such a right; they merely establish two propositions unrelated to
each other: (1) the government can collect taxes without a jury trial
in the first instance, and (2) the government can employ administrative agencies to determine eligibility for some congressionally
created "public rights," such as war risk insurance. 140 The latter,
however, are not the rights involved in Atlas. The two propositions
simply cannot be combined to support the Atlas rule. The tax cases
cited in Crowell are strictly limited by the seventh amendment history to collection of taxes; claims against the government are not
the same as claims by the government, and the remaining cases contain no discussion of any seventh amendment issue.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'41 is another case presented in support of Atlas. 42 Once again the actual holding is over136 430 U.S. at 452.

137 See 285 U.S. at 50-51.
3

' 8 The three are Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); and
Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893).
139 "[Petitioners] would have us disregard the dictum in Crowell v. Benson
." 430 U.S. at 456.
140 The quotation from Crowell set out in Atlas includes several illustrations
of administrative agencies with power to determine various matters such as "interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health,
the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans." 430 U.S. at
452 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). The non-tax examples
are a mixed collection of rate making cases, claims against the government, and
administrative cases in which there is no discussion of any seventh amendment
issue. There is no discussion in Crowell or Atlas of how collection of a penalty
by the government can be equated with, for example, a claim against the government under the War Risk Insurance Act, Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S.
221 (1924), or a claim against the government by a military officer for lost personal
property, United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328 (1919).
141301 U.S. 1 (1937).
142 430 U.S. at 453-54.
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stated. The primary reasoning used by the Court in Jones &
Laughlin to uphold the NLRB's order for reinstatement and back
pay against the employer's seventh amendment challenge was that
the remedy of reinstatement, even accompanied by an order for
back pay, was the type of relief historically available only from an
equity court. Therefore, the relief would not have been available
at common law, and the seventh amendment, by its terms, does not
require a common law jury in cases traditionally tried in equity.
143
The damage award was deemed incidental to the equitable relief.
Justice White interpreted the Jones & Laughlin opinion to include
a second ground for rejecting the seventh amendment argument:
the action was also a suit at common law because it is "one unknown
to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding." 144 Although the
Jones & Laughlin opinion itself does not so state, Justice White
concluded that the language was a clear holding that administrative
proceedings, as well as equity and admiralty suits, are not subject to
any seventh amendment challenge. That conclusion oversimplifies
the actual holding of Jones & Laughlin as well as the precedents
supporting the decision.
Even though the second ground identified by Justice White
was not stated to be a separate and independent reason for rejecting
the seventh amendment challenge, Justice White argued that it had
to be so considered because the first ground alone would be "insufficient to decide the more general question of the NLRB's power
to order backpay where... no such equitable order was sought." 145
The argument is weak because the Court did not decide that "more
general question" in Jones & Laughlin and has never expressly addressed the question in the ensuing forty years. 146 It is hardly sound
constitutional analysis to base an assault on the seventh amendment
on an interpretation of an implication in an earlier opinion in
which the issue was not discussed and in which not a single relevant
precedent is cited. The only precedent cited as authority for the
decision in Jones & Laughlin upheld factfinding by a court without
a jury in a case that involved a claim against a city in the Oklahoma
143

301 U.S. at 48-49.

144 430 U.S. at 453 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301

U.S. 1, 48 (1937)).
430 U.S. at 453 n.10.
The seventh amendment issue was not discussed in the only Supreme Court
case listed in the Atlas footnote as "See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 54
(1954)." Id. Jones & Laughlin was ignored on seventh amendment issues until
1974. The lower federal courts did not follow any consistent interpretation of
Jones & Laughlin. See Currie, supra note 91, at 1156 & n.248; Note, supra note 5,
at 470-71 & n.77 .
145

146
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Territory. 147 Other cases not cited in Jones & Laughlin had allowed
administrative or executive factfinding without a jury in cases such as
pension claims against the government,'48 the right to government
150
land under land grants,149 and rate setting for public utilities.
No case had upheld such administrative factfinding in a case in
which the government sought to exact money in a procedure analogous to that in OSHA.
If the language of Jones & Laughlin is interpreted as Justice
White suggests in Atlas (following the lead of Justice Marshall in
Curtis v. Loether and Pernell v. Southall Realty decided three years
earlier) the statement is purely dictum unsupported by authority.151
Jones & Laughlin supports the Atlas rule only if it is assumed that
if the administrative procedure of one agency in a particular case
does not violate the seventh amendment, then any agency and every
administrative procedure will be equally constitutional. That assumption can be made only if history is ignored. The correct interpretation of the seventh amendment should not depend so strongly
on the implications of a cryptic paragraph 8 2 when scores of past
opinions are available to explain the scope of the seventh amendment. The assumption takes the existence of a public rights exception as a given fact, and eliminates any need to demonstrate that
such a broad exception was known to the common law of 1791.
III.

RESTORING A RIGHT TO JuRY

TRiA.L-THE

TAx PRECEDENTS

The preceding section of this Article has argued that there was
no public rights exception to the seventh amendment known to the
common law of 1791 and that no public rights exception had been
established in the cases preceding Atlas. If Atlas created a public
rights exception, it did so only by expanding the exception for
administrative collection of taxes to include the collection of civil
penalties. If it is recognized that Atlas rests on the tax collection
147 Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528 (1899).

Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
0. Ry., 163 U.S. 321, 323
(1896), McCormick v. Hayes, 159 U.S. 332, 341-47 (1895).
15O E.g., Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930);
Virginian By. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658 (1926).
'5' Justice White in Atlas did not attempt to support his reading of Jones &
Laughlin with any other precedent.
152 The seventh amendment issue was discussed in two paragraphs at the end
of a 28 page opinion; clearly the jury trial issue was not the major concern of the
Court. See also Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1215, 1221-25 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, Aldisert, & Hunter, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 1226 (Garth, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Atlas Roofing Co. v.
148 E.g.,

149 E.g., Burfenning v. Chicago, St. P., M. &

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
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precedents, then the opinion did not completely exclude the possibility of a civil jury trial in OSHA actions. A modern taxpayer
has a statutory right to jury trial, not at the assessment or collection
stage, but only in an action to recover the tax after it has been collected by the government. 153
The opinion in Atlas does not discuss the possibility of a jury
trial in a refund action. The parties did not discuss the possibility
because the petitioners' challenge came after the proceedings before
the OSHRC but before the penalty had been paid. One implication
from the policy arguments presented in Atlas is that the Court intended to determine whether a right to jury trial exists at any stage
of these proceedings, either before or after collection. In its discussion of the prior cases, the Court appears to use "initial" administrative adjudication interchangeably with adjudication "exclusively" by an administrative agency. 15 4 One implication from this
is that the Court interpreted the tax collection precedents as establishing that there was never a constitutional right to a jury trial,
either before or after collection. Although a first reading of the
opinion suggests that the Court held there is never a right to a jury
trial in OSHA penalty cases, the Court actually held only that there
is no right to a jury trial before collection of the penalty.
Contrary to the implication of Atlas, the civil jury is not unknown in federal tax cases, and the seventh amendment guarantees
a right to jury trial in these cases. Why there is a right to a jury
trial has not always been clearly recognized; in recent years there
has been almost no attention to the extent of any constitutional
right. The analysis that establishes this right has not been examined
for decades but must be explored today. Otherwise, Atlas will be
the first step in misusing the narrow precedents from tax cases to
destroy much of the protection of the seventh amendment.
This section will focus primarily on the history prior to 1856,
the period not discussed in the Atlas opinion. That omission is
unfortunate, because the early cases develop perspective and explain
important distinctions in the later opinions. The analysis first examines the development of English tax procedures and the role of
the common law jury; the common law can fully be understood only
if its history is known. The available records of the colonial practices will then be examined to determine the influence of the
English experience on colonial law. With this background from the
English and colonial experience, the next section will discuss the
'5328 U.S.C. §2402 (1970).
154430 U.S. at 450.
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early cases between 1791 and 1835. This period is most often completely ignored 15 because there are no United States Supreme Court
opinions on point, but there is a wealth of lower federal and state
court opinions that illuminates the seventh amendment history.
Finally, the Supreme Court precedents will be examined to determine the extent to which the seventh amendment guarantees a jury
trial in tax cases.
A. The English History, 1601-1791
To a modem reader, the history of tax collection in England
appears complicated and incompletely recorded. Examination of
the history is made especially difficult by a lack of historical analysis
in the opinions of American courts that refer to bits of English
history without an explanation of why the particular precedents
chosen are relevant. 15 6 The most serious mistake is the assumption
that all English tax collection procedures are equally relevant to the
background of the seventh amendment. All English taxes were not
the same, nor were they collected in the same manner. English tax
cases can be understood and reconciled only by following the distinctions made in the common law. Therefore, the starting point
must be an outline of early English tax history to determine which
precedents are relevant to American decisions that interpret the
seventh amendment.
For present purposes the focus on English taxation concerns the
collection of three different kinds of revenue: the King's ordinary
revenue, the King's extraordinary revenue, and the local taxes like
the poor rate. The King's ordinary revenue came from eighteen
different sources, including the rents of the demesne lands, shipwrecks, treasure-trove, forfeitures for offenses, escheats, and custody
of idiots.'57 The King's extraordinary revenue included the land
tax, malt tax, customs on merchandise imported and exported, internal excise duty, salt duty, post office duty, stamp duty, house and
window duty, and servant duty. ins Local taxes such as the poor rate
15r See, e.g., Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue,
60 HARv. L. REv. 685, 688-89 (1947). See also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S.
145, 185-86 & n.5 (1960) (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
156 One example is the opinion of Justice Brandeis in Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589, 595-96 n.5 (1931), in which he incorrectly implies that administrative
tax collection by the United States is derived from the English immediate extent
in the second degree. The note documents the existence of each practice but fails
to document the asserted relationship. There does not appear to be any evidence
that the one was derived from the other.
*281-306.
NrAns
157 1 W. BLACKSTO1NM, Co0N
158 Id. *306-26.
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were not part of the royal revenue; they were raised and spent
locally under the authority of Parliamentary statutes. 159 Distinctions among the three types of taxation are important, because collection procedures were not the same and the place of the jury
differed in litigation involving each type of tax.
It is also important to recognize the differences among the
various English courts. 160 The four national courts of importance
in England were Common Pleas, King's Bench, Exchequer, and
Chancery. The Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction chiefly
over cases between subject and subject.161 The core jurisdiction of
King's Bench consisted of cases touching the King's interest, and encompassed criminal and civil cases and supervision over various state
officials. 162 Exchequer had jurisdiction over revenue matters; Exchequer also exercised some equitable and common law jurisdiction. 163 Chancery was the principal court of equity.164 The jurisdiction of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer overlapped
in many areas, however, because each court increased its jurisdiction
by the use of pleading fictions. Exchequer did retain as a core of
jurisdiction all cases touching the royal revenue, although not all
tax litigation was in this court.
Exchequer employed several forms of procedure to collect the
King's ordinary revenue; the most relevant to this discussion are the
extent and the information. The information was the procedure
used to collect forfeitures and to condemn seizures for violations of
the trade laws; the procedure included the right to a jury trial.16 5
The extent was used to collect debts, contract debts, and some of
the ordinary revenue; the procedure seems to have involved a jury,
although perhaps not the usual common law jury. 166 Neither procedure provided the foundation for the later development of ordi167
nary tax collection methods in the United States.
L59 Id. *359-65.
See generally 1 W. HOLDSWOTITH, A HIsTORY OF ENeLmH LAW 73-170,

160

194-264 (1903).
161 Id.76.
162 Id. 83.
163 Id. 104.
164 Id. 237-38.
165 See 3 W. BLAcKSToNE, supra note 157, at *261-62.

See also People v.

One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951).
166 See J. CBrry, supra note 96, at 265-71.
167 The manner in which the practice of the information affects seventh amendment interpretation was discussed in the preceding section on the early penalty
cases, see text accompanying notes 75-81 supra. The manner in which the practice
of the extent affects seventh amendment analysis was discussed in the preceding
section on Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., see text accompanying notes 92-114 supra.
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These Exchequer processes were developed over the centuries
to collect the King's ordinary revenue. The extent and the information did not provide a model for tax collection in the colonies,
however, because these taxes had declined in importance by 1600.168
The forfeitures, collected through the information process, were
common throughout England, but it is unlikely that many of the
settlers were familiar with the extent procedure used to collect most
of the other ordinary revenue. The extraordinary revenue and the
poor rate were taxes to which most of the colonists were subject in
England, so the tax collection procedures for the extraordinary
revenue and the poor rate were more familiar to the colonists.
These were the procedures transplanted to the New World, later to
become part of the background of the seventh amendment.
The poor rate has the longer history of the two taxes. A
Parliamentary statute in 1601 created the poor rate throughout
England. 169 In each community the overseers of the poor were to
raise money for the relief of the poor by collecting a poor rate similar in form to a real property tax. In addition to the overseers, the
local justices of the peace were involved as supervisors of the overseers, as assessors, and as a board of review at quarter sessions.' 7 0
If anyone did not voluntarily pay the rate assessed, the overseers
could collect the amount under a warrant from any two justices of
the peace authorizing distress and sale of the goods of the nonpayer.' 71 The procedure was summary and not in the form of a
lawsuit; the justices acted in an administrative rather than a judicial
capacity. There were, of course, no trial at common law and no
jury involved in the issuance of the warrant for nonpayment or in
the distress and sale.' 7 2 The procedure allowed assessment and collection of taxes with the relevant facts initially determined by an
"administrative agency." The remedy for those aggrieved by this
summary process was review by the justices of the peace at their
quarter sessions. 73 The collection process was entirely local and
did not involve the Exchequer or its processes at all.174
168 See 1 W. Br.AcXsTom, supra note 157, at *306.
See 10
169 An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 43 Eliz. c. 2 (1601).
W. HoLnswoRTH, supra note 160, at 269-99 (1938). See generally id. 173-77,

211-14, 257-69.
170 10 W. Hor~swoTwri, supra note 160, at 288-89.
171 An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 43 Eliz., c. 2, § 4 (1601).
172

See id.

173 See id. § 6.
174

See authority cited note 169 supra.
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The primary part of the extraordinary revenue, the land tax,
has a more recent history.17 5 This tax was adopted following the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, when Parliament settled a revenue on
the new rulers, William and Mary, and provided for a land tax to
replace several other exactions of earlier royalty..76 The method of
collection for the land tax was similar to, although more involved
than, that for the poor rate. 1 77 The country was divided into collection districts, each district was assigned a quota of the total tax,
and collection of the portion of the annual tax required of the area
was made by local assessors and collectors. The local subcollectors
paid the money to head collectors who in turn paid the money to
receivers general. The receivers general then sent the tax for their
area to the Exchequer in London. 7 8
Nonpaying citizens were not subject to Exchequer process; instead the local collectors had the power to levy and sell goods or
chattels for nonpayment. Again the distress and sale was not authorized by any judicial order or law suit, but by a precept from the local
commissioners. 179 A claim of an inaccurate assessment did not involve the judges because review of assessments was also done by the
local commissioners 180 as an administrative function; it was not a
common law suit and had no jury trial. Exchequer process was
available against a receiver who did not account to the Exchequer
for the money collected,' 8 ' but even seriously defaulting receivers
were rarely proceeded against by Exchequer extent. 8 2 There is no
evidence that ordinary taxpayers were ever subject to the extent;
they either paid the local collector voluntarily, or the local collector
8 3
levied and sold their property.
Both the poor rate and the land tax were collected without
using common law actions in the courts, but the common law jury
had a place in both collection processes. There was no right to a
175 See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 157, at *308-13; W. WA~u,
supra note 95, at 1-3.
176 An act for granting to their Majesties an Aid of four Shillings in the

Pound for one year for carrying on a vigorous War against France, 4 W. & M.,
c. 1 (1692).
177 Compare id. with 43 Eliz., c. 2 (1601).
1784 W. & M., c. 1, §10 (1692).
179 Id. § 12.
180 Id. § 20. See 3 R. BURN, THE JusTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARIsH OFFICER
47 (11th ed. 1769).
181 J. C=rrry, supra note 96, at 266.
182 See W. WARD, supra note 95, at 100-13.
183 See notes 97 & 98 supra & accompanying text. See generally G. GILBERT,
An HISTORICAL ViEv OF THE CoUtRT OF EXCHEQUER AND OF THE KiNG's l vEU Es
THERE ANSwERED (London 1738); G. GILBERT, TREATISE ON TIE COURT OF
EXCHEQuER (London 1758); W. WARD, supra note 95.
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jury trial before the tax was collected because the collection did not
involve the judicial function; the possibility of a jury arose after
collection in common law actions challenging liability for the tax. 8s
The role of the jury increased with the growth of the power of the
common law courts. The contest between crown and Parliament
in the 17th century over the power to tax was eventually won by
Parliament. That contest was the most dramatic of the period, but
during the same period that Parliament was increasing its power the
common law courts were also expanding their jurisdiction. The
procedure in the common law courts involved the jury trial; therefore, the increasing power of the common law courts meant an increase in the use of the jury.
An early and central figure in the development of the role of
the jury was Sir Edward Coke. His efforts to elevate the common
law courts were unsuccessful when he attacked Chancery; in the
best-known showdown, James I clearly placed Chancery above the
common law courts. 8 5 Other efforts are less well known, even
though they were more successful, especially the effort to control the
many specialized courts. The landmark opinion was that of Lord
Coke sitting in King's Bench in the Case of the Marshalsea.8 6 By
1600 the ancient Court of the Marshalsea existed only as a special
court with its jurisdiction limited to disputes involving members of
the royal household or anyone living within twelve miles of the
King's residence. 18 7 In practice, however, the court did not restrict
its jurisdiction to those limits, and in the Case of the Marshalsea,
King's Bench successfully declared that it had the power to control
such a limited court. The control was indirect; if such a court
exceeded its powers, the party injured by the usurpation could sue
the judges in a common law action in King's Bench. 188 The determination whether the limited jurisdiction had been exceeded was
made by King's Bench, not by the specialized court. This enhancement of the power of King's Bench seems to have been unchallenged
184 For example, an action against the collector in trespass, trover, or in
assumpsit for money had and received. See notes 194-99 infra & accompanying
text.
85
See Arguments Proving from Antiquity the Dignity, Power, and jurisdiction
'
of the Court of Chancery, 21 Eng. Rep. 576 (1616). See generally 10 W. HoLDswORTH, supra note 160, at 648-50.
186 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612).
187

See 3 W.

BLAcKsoNE,

supra note 157, at 075-76.

For example, in the Case of the Marshalsea, the suit was an action of
trespass of assault, battery, wounding, and false imprisonment against the marshal
of the Marshalsea, an officer of the staff, and a minor officer who had arrested and
imprisoned the plaintiff under a precept from the Court of the Marshalsea.
188

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

1318

[Vol 126:1281

and became an established precedent to be developed by later judges
in King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer.1 8 9
A similar effort to control the local sewer commissions-restricted courts with power of levy and sale to collect assessments to
support drainage facilities-resulted in a standoff between the common law courts and the Crown. 190 The privy council asserted
authority to oust the common law courts from any jurisdiction to
control the sewer commissions, and Lord Coke's refusal to accept
that limitation was a reason for his discharge by James I as Lord
Chief Justice, 191 but eventually the later judges also established the
1 92
power of King's Bench to control the sewer commissions.
These early assertions by the common law courts were part of a
larger development, "for the common lawyers had formed the
grandiose plan of making their system sole and supreme over all
persons and causes." 193 Eventually solid doctrine emerged that subjected the administrative officials such as tax collectors to the power
of the common law courts. The power was asserted in common law
actions in which the local and Crown officials were required to defend their conduct by proving jurisdiction to take the action challenged by the injured citizen. The use of the common law actions
in the common law courts necessarily involved civil jury trial as an
essential part of the procedure. An official was not liable for an
error in exercising jurisdiction actually granted, but the injured
citizen could win if the official had exceeded his jurisdiction.
Two early cases illustrate the scope of the power of control
exercised by the common law courts during this important period
of development. The first, Nichols v. Walker,194 involved the poor
rate in a 1634 case. The action was in trespass against the church
warden and the overseer of the poor of the parish of Hatfield. The
defendants entered the plaintiff's house and seized his chattels, which
were sold to collect the poor rate. Plaintiff claimed he was not subject to the poor rate because he was not an inhabitant of Hatfield
18 9 The development in Exchequer was in the common law part of Exchequer
and not the revenue part.
190 See Hetley v. Boyer, 79 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1614); The Case of Chester
Mill Upon the River of Dee, 77 Eng. Rep. 1134 (K.B. 1609); Keighley's Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 1136 (K.B. 1609); The Case of the Isle of Ely, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139
(K.B. 1609).
191 10 W. HoLmswowrT, supra note 160, at 648.
192 See generally 3 W. BLAcKSTONE, supra note 157, at *73-74; 10 W. HormswonTa, supra note 160, at 199-206.
, A CONCISE HISTOnY OF TmE COMMON LAW 197 (5th ed.
193 T. PLucxN

1956).

See generally 5 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

19479 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1634).

supra note 160, at 423-93.
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and owned no land in the parish. Apparently there were no factual
issues for the jury to determine, because the defendants admitted
the taking. They justified their action by claiming that the village
of Tottridge, where plaintiff lived, was part of the parish of Hatfield.
The jury found a special verdict, leaving the court to determine
whether Tottridge was still part of Hatfield, even though there was
no legal record of a separation. The court held for the plaintiff
and determined that he was not subject to being rated in Hatfield.
The defendants' claim that they should not be liable for the trespass
because their acts were authorized by a warrant from the justices of
the peace was rejected; the warrant provided authority only if the
justices had jurisdiction, and the factual finding in King's Bench
established there was no such jurisdiction.
A later case in Exchequer in 1668 195 was an action of trover
and conversion for goods levied and sold by the commissioners of
excise in London to collect an excise on wine, a part of the King's
extraordinary revenue. Again it appears that the jury returned a
special verdict finding the facts; the case reported is the argument
and decision of the full court on the legal question. The defense of
the commissioners (that they were only mistaken in the exercise of
their jurisdiction) was unsuccessful. By assessing a duty on wine
that was later found not dutiable in the trover action, the commissioners exceeded their authority and were therefore liable to the
plaintiff.
By 1791 the doctrine had matured, and established that officials
collecting the poor rate, land tax, excise duty, or similar taxes were
liable to a common law action in which King's Bench, Common
Pleas, or Exchequer would determine whether the officials had
properly determined that the tax was owed. The hardship on the
officials of being subject to suit did not cause either the King or
Parliament to oust the common law courts from the jurisdiction
developed over two centuries. The only relief extended to the
officials was a requirement of one month's advance notice of any suit
brought against them with particulars (evidence at trial to be limited
to that mentioned in any such notice), a chance to tender amends,
a special pleading statute that allowed a defendant to plead the
general issue and to defend under that plea with evidence of the
particular authority, and the right to treble costs if plaintiff discontinued or lost his action.' 96 The form of the action varied; liability
195 Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B.
196

E.g., 24 Geo. 3, c. 70, §§ 30-34 (1783).

1668).

See aiso An act for ease in

pleading troublesome and contentious suits prosecuted against justices of the peace,

1320

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

to a tax was challenged in actions of trespass,

97

[Vol. 126:1281

trover,1 98 and money

had and received. 99 Significantly, the common law actions were not
available to challenge the amount of an assessment or tax, 200 although a review of assessments was available from the justices of the
peace at quarter sessions (or from the local commissioners in the case
of the land tax). 201 Doctrine based on the Case of the Marshalsea
did not make the officials liable for an erroneous assessment, because
such a mistake would have been an error in exercising a granted
jurisdiction and not an attempt to exercise jurisdiction beyond that
granted.
These precedents developed in the English courts between 1601
and 1791 allowed a citizen to litigate most disputes over tax liability
before a common law civil jury. The common law actions were not
available if the liability had already been litigated in the Exchequer
by condemnation of the goods. 20 2 The contest did not occur before
the collection of the tax, because collection was accomplished without invoking the judicial power in the context of a lawsuit. Although in many cases the jury served only to return a special verdict
and left the real contest to the decision of the judges, it cannot be
denied that the traditional role of the jury in the tax cases was
firmly established. The role and power of the jury that followed
from this successful assertion of jurisdiction by the common law
courts were transplanted to the colonies, where the jury eventually
formed part of the background of the seventh amendment. 203
B. The American Experience Prior to 1791
Published reports of American decisions prior to 1791 are rare;
the few volumes available provide an extremely limited picture of
mayors, constables, and certain other his Majesty's officers, for the lawful execution
of their office, 7 Jac., c. 5 (1609).
197 E.g., Williams v. Pritchard, 100 Eng. Rep. 862 (K.B. 1790); Harrison v.
Bulcock, 126 Eng. Rep. 42 (C.P. 1788); Lord Amherst v. Lord Sommers, 100 Eng.
Rep. 200 (K.B. 1788); Hutchins v. Chambers, 97 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1758).
See also Patchett v. Bancroft, 101 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1797).
198 E.g., Eddington v. Borman, 100 Eng. Rep. 863 (K.B. 1790).
199 E.g., Irving v. Wilson, 100 Eng. Rep. 1132 (K.B. 1791); Stevenson v.
Mortimer, 98 Eng. Rep. 1372 (K.B. 1778); Campbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045
(K.B. 1774); Camplin v. Bullman, 145 Eng. Rep. 755 (Ex. 1761).
200
Patchett v. Bancroft, 101 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1797).
201

See 10 W. HoLDswoTn, supra note 160, at 287-89; note 180 supra &

accompanying text.
202
2

3

Scott v. Shearman, 96 Eng. Rep. 575 (K.B. 1774).

The English common law courts became less vigorous in asserting their
jurisdiction after 1791, but by that time the doctrine had become established in
the United States. See Earl of Radnor v. Reeve, 126 Eng. Rep. 1345 (C.P. 1801);
Allen v. Sharp, 154 Eng. Rep. 529 (Ex. 1848).
0
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the precedents on tax collection procedure and the jury trial known
to the framers when the Constitution and the seventh amendment
were adopted. Although frequently neglected, an examination of
colonial practice is also necessary to a complete understanding of
which tax precedents were part of the common law known in the
colonies before 1791. The framers' understanding of the English
common law that the seventh amendment was intended to preserve
may not have included the entire English practice. English juries
were involved in common law suits against tax collectors, but not in
the extent procedure of the Exchequer, so two different lines of
precedent could have been preserved. Fortunately, there is evidence
from the American experience prior to 1791 to establish that jury
determination of liability in taxpayer cases was part of the common
law known in colonial procedure.
The best illustration of the use of a common law action to
challenge tax liability is the Massachusetts case of Eruing v.
Cradock.2 04 This 1761 case was reported and more widely known
than most decisions because it was not an ordinary action. The
suit was a test case brought as an attempt to create a new method of
resisting collection of English duties in the colonies. George
Cradock served as collector for the port of Boston. He had seized a
ship owned by John Erving, charged it with trade in contraband,
and libeled the ship in the court of admiralty where a jury trial was
not available. In the admiralty court Erving agreed to a settlement
providing for the return of the ship to him upon payment of one
half of its appraised value to the court. The money was paid, distributed by the court as required, and the case ended in the
admiralty court.
Upon termination of the admiralty procedure, Erving brought
a trespass action against Cradock in the colonial court of common
pleas, and alleged that the seizure had been illegal. The jury found
for Erving and awarded him damages in excess of £600. On appeal
to the superior court, another jury again found for Erving and
awarded damages of £740. The liability of the collector to such a
common law action does not appear to have been in dispute. The
earlier proceedings in the admiralty court should have prevented
such a verdict for Erving, because the issues once had been decided
by a court of competent jurisdiction, 20 5 but the Massachusetts juries
deliberately ignored the admiralty decision. Erving's victory, however, was short-lived. Cradock appealed to the privy council, in
204
205

Quincy 553 (Mass. Prov. 1761).
See Scott v. Shearman, 96 Eng. Rep. 575 (K.B. 1775).

1322

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:1281

which Erving did not contest the appeal but acknowledged full
28
satisfaction of the judgment.
The final result in Erving v. Cradock appears to establish that a
decision of the admiralty court acting within its jurisdiction would
be controlling in a subsequent common law action. Thus, Erving's
attempt to create a new mode of resistance may not have been fully
successful in this case, but many other similar actions were brought
in an effort to hamper the collectors. 20 7 These cases show that
liability of a tax collector to a common law suit was known in the
208
colonies.
The Parliamentary response to Erving v. Cradock was not an
attempt to oust the common law courts' jurisdiction; that jurisdiction seems to have been recognized and accepted. Instead,
Parliament provided protection for revenue officers in the form of a
new statute that barred any action or suit if the admiralty court
certified that there was probable cause for the seizure. If the
admiralty court did not act, the plaintiff could still bring suit,
but the potential recovery was limited to the ship or goods seized,
and damages of two pence. The plaintiff was not entitled to costs,
and the defendant officer could be fined no more than one
20 9
shilling.
In addition to case law, the debates on the adoption of the
Constitution are another source of evidence for the background of
the seventh amendment. The Constitution empowers Congress to
tax2 10 and to create a judicial system, 211 but it does not provide a
method of tax collection or a procedure for challenging the collection. There are some references in the available material on the
debates to taxes, tax collections, courts, and juries, but those references do not explicitly discuss the role of the jury in tax cases.
They do reflect assumptions about the relation of the jury to tax
matters and can provide evidence of the background of the seventh
amendment. Caution is required before determining that the
scattered history supports the position that the drafters expected the
jury to play the role postulated thus far. Another commentator
has suggested that some expected the jury would play a nullifica206 Quincy

553, 557 n.4.
supra note 77, at 33-35, 165-77.

207 C. UBBELOHDE,
208

See W. NFLSON,

AmEUCANIZATION

OF THE COMMON

LAw

17, 31-32

(1975).
209

An Act Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in

America, 1764, 4 & 5 Geo. 3, c. 15, §§46 & 47 (1764)
210 U.S. CONST., aLt. I, § 8.
211 U.S. CONST., art IIL

(repealed 1867).
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tion role in federal tax matters similar to that expected in suits
brought by British merchants to collect debts 2 1 2 That role for the

jury would be unusual and not grounded in the English law, but
the use of the jury to defeat just debts due unpopular creditors was
not grounded in English common law and consequently not openly
discussed. As the following excerpts indicate, the jury does not
appear to have been intended to nullify tax collection; it was
assumed that the jury could be used to control tax officials by
common law actions.
The need for a guarantee of jury trial to protect the citizens
against the tax collectors of the new federal government was raised
in the published letters of opponents of the Constitution, discussed
in the Federalist defense of the Constitution, and debated at some
length in the ratifying conventions of Virginia and North Carolina.
One early attack on the Constitution was the speech of Luther
Martin before the Maryland House of Delegates, an attack later
expanded into his pamphlet Genuine Information.21 3 Martin feared
that the Constitution gave the federal government arbitrary power
to impose whatever taxes or duties it pleased. Worse still, the
officers appointed to collect the federal revenue would not be accountable to the states nor be subject to the jurisdiction of the
state courts. Therefore, he considered the proposed federal courts,
and saw a danger:
[I]n all those cases where the general government has jurisdiction in civil questions, the proposed constitution not
only makes no provision for trial by jury in the first instance, but, by its appellate jurisdiction, absolutely takes
away that inestimable privilege; since it expressly declares
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both
as to law and fact. Should, therefore, a jury be adopted in
the inferior court, it would only be a needless expense,
since, on an appeal, the determinationof that jury, even on
questions of fact, however honest and upright, is to be of
no possible effect.
Thus, Sir, jury trials, which have ever been the boast
of the English constitution, which have been by our several
State constitutions so cautiously secured to us,-jury trials,
which have so long been considered the surest barrier
212 Wolfram,

supra note 10, at 705-08.

213 Martin, Genuine Information (1787) in SECRET PRocEEDiNcs AND DEBATES
oF Trm CoNvEnToN 1 (1845), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF Tm FEDmIAL

CoNVENToN oF

1787, at 172, 204 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
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against arbitrarypower, and the palladium of liberty, with
the loss of which the loss of our freedom may be dated, are
taken away, by the proposed form of government, not only
in a great variety of questions between individual and individual, but in every case, whether civil or criminal, arising under the laws of the United States, or the execution
of those laws. It is taken away in those very cases, where,
of all others, it is most essential for our liberty to have it
sacredly guarded and preserved; in every case, whether civil
or criminal, between government and its officers on the
214
one part, and the subject or citizen on the other.
From this omission Luther concluded that
every arbitrary act of the general government, and every
oppression of all that variety of officers appointed under its
authority, for the collection of taxes, duties, impost, excise,
and other purposes, must be submitted to by the individual, or must be opposed with little prospect of success, and
almost a certain prospect of ruin, at least in those cases
where the middle and common class of citizens are interested; since, to avoid that oppression, or to obtain redress,
the application 5must be made to one of the courts of the
1
2
United States.

The best known response to this and similar arguments is in
The FederalistNumber 83,216 in which Hamilton developed several
counterarguments:
It has been observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard
against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation.
This observation deserves to be canvassed.
It is evident that it can have no influence upon the
legislature, in regard to the amount of the taxes to be laid,
to the objects upon which they are to be imposed, or to the
rule by which they are to be apportioned. If it can have
any influence, therefore, it must be upon the mode of collection, and the conduct of the officers entrusted with the
execution of the revenue laws.
As to the mode of collection in [New York], under our
own Constitution, the trial by jury is in most cases out of
use. The taxes are usually levied by the more summary
proceeding of distress and sale, as in cases of rent. And it
Id. 80-81 (emphasis added).
Id. 82 (emphasis added).
21 6T n FDERALIST No. 83 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
214
215
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is acknowledged on all hands, that this is essential to the
efficacy of the revenue laws. The dilatory course of a trial
at law to recover the taxes imposed on individuals, would
neither suit the exigencies of the public, nor promote the
convenience of the citizens. It would often occasion an
accumulation of costs, more burthensome than the original
sum of the tax to be levied.
And as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue,
the provision in favor of trial by jury in criminal cases,
will afford the security aimed at. Wilful abuses of a public
authority, to the oppression of the subject, and every
species of official extortion, are offences against the government, for which the persons who commit them, may be
indicted and punished according to the circumstances of
7
21
the case.

Hamilton's discussion may be accurate, but it is incomplete and
does not directly meet the objections. The precedents did not allow
common law actions or jury trials on the amount of revenue to be
raised, the amount of any particular assessment, or the object to be
taxed. Distress and sale could be used to collect, so that a suit to
compel payment of taxes was not required. The important issue
was whether the citizen could bring a common law action against
the tax officials if they collected a tax that was not due, which would
constitute a civil action historically tried by a jury. Hamilton did
not deny that the common law allowed an aggrieved citizen to bring
a civil action; that issue was ignored in a weak assertion that the
jury in a criminal case would provide enough control, at least if the
tax officials willfully abused their authority. Contrary to the conclusion based on a first reading, The Federalist does not establish
that the jury was not a safeguard against oppressive tax collections,
because the real role of the jury was ignored by Hamilton.
The records from other state ratification conventions indicate
that the common law jury did have a role in tax collections, although those records do not contain direct statements on the scope
of judicial review of the decisions of tax collectors. 218 Most of the
debate over the taxing power concerned the question whether the
new Congress should have the power of direct taxation or should be
required to rely on the states to raise and collect taxes to meet federal requisitions. There was no discussion on the narrow question
whether a citizen could obtain redress in a jury trial if a federal tax
217 Id.

522-23.

218 See generally J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF Tz
STATES, ANTcEEDENTs AND BEGInNGS To

SUPREME CoUmr OF TBE UNrr

1801, at 324-412 (1971).
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collector mistakenly collected a tax that was not owed. The records
do provide notes from related discussion concerning the need for a
jury to control federal officials, which supports the conclusion that
the delegates understood the law of 1788 to allow judicial review of
the acts of tax collectors in common law actions. Although there is
no assurance that the discussion by the delegates accurately reflects
the finer points of judicial procedure, the debates seem to indicate
a consistent assumption by the speakers.
In the Virginia convention, the issues of tax collection and
juries were discussed at greater length than in any other state, primarily because of the speeches of Patrick Henry. Henry's objections
to the new Constitution included opposition to the unlimited power
of taxation and a distrust of the assurance that "these powers, given
to Congress, are accompanied by a judiciary which will correct
all." 219 The judiciary was too weak because the judges were dependent on Congress, and the protection of a jury trial was not
assured in the new federal courts. Henry feared that the protection
of the jury in the state courts would not suffice, because any actions
against federal officials would necessarily have to be in federal
court.220 These arguments by Henry, joined by George Mason, 221
were answered in the convention. Governor Randolph stated his
belief that federal taxes would be collected in the same manner as
state taxes-voluntarily or by distress. Federal collectors need not
be feared because "such an officer would be amenable to the laws,
like any other citizen. He is only protected by the law where he
,, 222 John Marshall also indicated his underacts lawfully ....
standing that the federal official would be liable to a common law
action, in either the federal courts or the state courts, because
"[t]here is no clause in the Constitution which bars the individual
member injured from applying to the state courts to give him
redress." 223
The most extensive discussion of the common law liability of
officials was in the North Carolina convention, as supporters of the
Constitution responded to the claim that an impeachment of the tax
collector was the only remedy an injured citizen could seek. 224 Two
219 3 TnE DEBATES in THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
OF

ON THE Ano'ro'

rsm FEDRA., CoNsT'TTIoN 57 (G. Elliot ed. 1888).
220 See id. 167-68, 326-27, 577-78.
221 Id. 524-26.
222Id.

127. See also id. 121-22.

Id. 554.
224 We shall undoubtedly, for instance, have a great number of taxgatherers. If any of these officers shall do wrong, when we come to
223
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delegates responded that impeachment was unnecessary because the
injured citizen could always "get redress by a suit at law." 225 James
Iredell, then a Federalist delegate and later Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, explained more fully:
Mr. Chairman, the objection would be right if there was
no other mode of punishing. But it is evident that an
officer may be tried by a court of common law. He may
be tried in such a court for common-law offences, whether
impeached or not. As it is to be presumed that inferior
tribunals will be constituted, there will be no occasion for
going always to the Supreme Court, even in cases where the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Where this exclusive cognizance is not given them, redress may be had
in the common-law courts in the state; and I have no doubt
such regulations will be made as will put it out of the
228
power of officers to distress the people with impunity.
Governor Johnston later spoke in support of Mr. Iredell, observing:
Mr. Chairman, impeachment is very different in its
nature from what the learned gentleman from Granville
supposes it to be. If an officer commits an offence against
an individual, he is amenable to the courts of law. If he
commits crimes against the state, he may be indicted and
punished. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and
misdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public.
But I think neither that gentleman nor any other person
need be afraid that officers who commit oppressions will
fundamental principles, we find that we have no way to punish them but
by going to Congress, at an immense distance, whither we must carry our
witnesses. Every gentleman must see, in these cases, that oppressions will
arise. I conceive that they cannot be tried elsewhere ...
In answer to Mr. Taylor, Mr. SPArGHT observed that, though the
power of impeacbment was given, yet it did not say that there was no
other manner of giving redress-that it was very certain and clear that, if
any man was injured by an officer of the United States, he could get

redress by a suit at law.
4 TbE DEBATES IN THE SE, ay r STATE CoNwENTioNs oN THE ADoPToN OF
F DERAr CoNsrrruuroN 36-37 (J. Elliot ed. 1888).
22 5
Mr. MACL.ArnE. Mr. Chairman, I confess I never heard before that a
tax-gatherer was worthy of impeachment. It is one of the meanest and
least offices. Impeachments are only for high crimes and misdemeanors.
If any one is injured in his person or property, he can get redress by a
suit at law.
Id. 37.
226 Id.
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pass with impunity. It is not to be apprehended that such
officers will be tried by their cousins and friends. Such
cannot be on the jury at the trial of the cause; it being a
principle of law that no person interested in a cause, or
who is a relation of the party, can be a juror in it. This
is the light in which it strikes me. Therefore the objection
must necessarily fall to
of the gentleman from Granville
227
the ground on that principle.
These few excerpts may not provide a complete picture in
themselves, but they are consistent in their indication of which
English precedents were known in the colonies. Equally important
is the absence of any evidence that other precedent was followed in
the colonies. There is nothing to indicate any understanding that
the actions of tax officials would be immune from judicial review
because administrative determinations would be conclusive. Similarly, there is no evidence that the Exchequer procedure of the
extent was used to collect taxes in the colonies or that it was intended to be used to collect federal taxes without a jury under the
new constitution.
The liability of tax collectors to common law actions developed
in the English courts from the doctrine espoused in the Case of the
8 was the only theory upon which the case of Erring v.
Marshalsea22
Cradock z22 could have been brought; it is also the only English
precedent that would support the statements in the ratification debates that a federal official would be subject to an action in the state
or federal court. The strong evidence that the founders understood
and expected that taxpayers could obtain redress by a common law
action against a tax official must therefore be taken as establishing
that such actions were part of the common law for which the right
to a jury trial was preserved by the seventh amendment.
C. Liability of the Tax Collector: 1791-1835
The United States Supreme Court did not determine whether a
federal tax official could be sued by a taxpayer in a common law
2 30
action until the issue was presented in 1836 in Elliott v. Swartwout.
227

Id. 48. See also id. 45-48.

22877 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612).

See text accompanying notes 186-90

supra.
229 Quincy 553 (Mass. Prov. 1761).
supra.

See text accompanying notes 204-09

23035 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836).

See text accompanying notes 246-47 infra.
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The effect of the seventh amendment on such suits was not expressly
considered by the Court until 1845.231 The Court's silence on this
issue from 1789 to 1836 does not prove that federal tax collectors
were completely immune from common law actions. A large number of cases from the lower federal courts and the state courts illustrates that the English doctrine of liability to a common law action
had been brought across the Atlantic and applied in American
courts.32

For the initial period immediately following 1789, only limited
evidence is available because of the incomplete reports of cases in
the early years. State appellate opinions were not yet systematically
reported, and even a complete record of appellate opinions would
provide an insufficient picture of the work of the trial courts. Several early opinions indicate that tax collectors were sued in the
common law actions of trespass or trover, but most of the opinions
are too brief to provide a reliable guide to the finer points of then
current doctrine. 233 Opinions by Judge James Kent in 1803 and
by Justice Joseph Story in 1830 describe the legal doctrines more
fully.
The opinions of the New York Supreme Court of Judicature
in 1803 in Henderson v. Brown 234 present some of the best early
analysis. The action was in trespass against a federal tax collector
who had collected the federal land tax by a distress on $325 in cash
found in plaintiff's building. In 1798 Congress had enacted the
tax that taxed lands, dwelling houses, and slaves.235 Dwelling
houses were to be assessed in one manner, and all other land was to
be assessed separately, but the same assessor acted on both forms of
property. The assessor had assessed plaintiff's building as a dwelling
house; plaintiff asserted the building was a theater that should have
been assessed in the other list at a lesser value. The plaintiff had
not followed the procedure for review of the assessor's action that
was provided by the statute. Instead, plaintiff brought an action
231 In 1845 the Court decided Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 235 (1845).
See text accompanying notes 248-58 infra.
232 See cases cited in note 245 infra.
233 See, e.g., Beacher v. Bray, 1 Root 459 (Conn. 1792); Belt v. Perry, 4 H. &
McH. 348 (Md. 1799); Bergen v. Clarkson, 6 N.J.L. 352 (1796); Buchannan v.
Biggs, 2 Yeates 232 (Pa. 1797); Wilcox v. Sherwin, 1 D. Chip. 72 (Vt. 1797).
Statutes such as the Massachusetts law allowing commonwealth officers to plead
the general issue and defend with evidence that the act was done in the execution
of the office also indicate that common law actions against officials were known.
Act of Feb. 25, 1793, Laws of Mass. 560.
234 1 Cal. R. 92 (N.Y. 1803).
235 Act to lay and collect a direct tax within the United States, ch. 75, § 11,
1 Stat. 600 (1798).
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for trespass against the collector and relied on the recent English
cases that recognized trespass against the collector as an available
remedy to test tax liability. The court gave judgment for the defendant, but divided three to two. Four opinions are extensively
reported, but the strongest and decisive opinion was that of Judge
James Kent.
Judge Kent's opinion distinguished and reconciled the seemingly conflicting precedents advanced by the parties and other
judges. The collector derived his authority from the assessors, so to
Judge Kent the important issue was the scope of the federal assessors'
jurisdiction. He reasoned that the collector could be held liable in
a common law action if he or the assessors had exceeded their jurisdiction by taxing property not subject to the tax statute. The
collector was not liable in this case because the assessors had not
exceeded their jurisdiction; at most they had committed an error in
exercising granted jurisdiction. 236 Henderson v. Brown confirmed
that the federal tax collector could be sued in a state court in a
common law action of trespass, even though the plaintiff lost on
the merits.
In later cases the New York courts entertained other trespass
actions against federal officers charged with exceeding their authority. At least one plaintiff successfully sued the federal collector of customs for the Port of New York; 237 other plaintiffs were
unsuccessful because of pleading defenses or because the goods had
been previously libeled and condemned in federal court. 23 8 None
of the opinions indicated, however, that the federal officials were
immune from suit. One action in assumpsit established that a
shipowner could challenge the authority of the customs collector to
demand a duty in the common law action of assumpsit brought to
recover the amount paid.239 The New York courts also allowed
such actions against state and local officials. In 1816 the court
affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff in an action of trover against
a collector for a school district, who had levied upon and sold property of the plaintiffs. 240 Again the court distinguished between a
want of jurisdiction and erroneous assessment, and found that the
collector had acted without jurisdiction. 241 The statute involved
236 Henderson v. Brown, 1 Cai. R. 92, 102 (N.Y. 1803).
23
7Woodhan v. Gelston, 1 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1806).
238
Van Brunt v. Schenck, 11 Johns. 377 (N.Y. 1814); Sailly v. Smith, 11
Johns. 500 (N.Y. 1814).
239 Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. 201 (N.Y. 1812).
24 0
Suydam v. Keys, 13 Johns. 444 (N.Y. 1816).

24

1Id. 446-47.

1978]

ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AND THE CIVIL JURY

1331

in the case authorized taxation of residents of the town of Munroe;
the plaintiffs established at trial that they were residents of New
York City.
The case law had solidly established the liability of a tax collector to the common law trespass action prior to 1830 when the
issue arose before Justice Joseph Story in the circuit court in
Thurston v. Martin.24 The defendant Martin was the collector of
taxes for Newport, Rhode Island; he had arrested and imprisoned
Thurston for nonpayment of the town tax, a nonjudicial remedy
authorized by the tax law. Thurston claimed he was not required
to pay the tax because he was not a resident of Newport. The jury
was instructed to find for the plaintiff if they determined he was not
a resident of Newport, and the jury did find for the plaintiff for
$505. Justice Story denied the motion for a new trial in an opinion
that traced the English precedents starting with the Case of the
Marshalsea243 and the American cases including Henderson v.
Brown. He concluded that an official was liable in trespass if the
action was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, board, or tribunal,
but he was not liable if he made a mistake or acted irregularly in
the exercise of that jurisdiction.24 The history summarized by
Justice Story demonstrates that the common law courts were not
completely excluded from tax collection matters. Administrative
collection by nonjudicial means was employed and considered constitutional, but the administrative factfinding did not bar a challenge in the common law courts before a civil jury if the taxpayer
2
claimed that no tax was owed.

45

F. Cas. 1189 (C.C.D.R.I. 1830).
Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612).
244 Thurston v. Martin, 23 F. Cas. 1189, 1191 (C.C.D.R.I. 1830).
243 Other reported cases from many states show that the tax collector was
generally subject to common law liability if the taxpayer alleged no tax had been
owed. Connecticut (Allen v. Gleason, 4 Day 376 (1810) (trespass and false imprisonment); Thames Mfg. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550 (1829) (trespass); Prince
v. Thomas, 11 Conn. 472 (1836) (false imprisonment and conversion)); District
of Columbia (Farmers Bank v. Fox, 4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 330 (1833) (trespass));
Maine (Huse v. Merriam, 2 Me. 375 (1823) (trespass against assessor to challenge
legality of tax); Mussey v. White, 3 Me. 290 (1825) (trespass against assessors to
challenge legality of procedure)); Massachusetts (Rising v. Granger, 1 Mass. 47
(1804) (assault, battery, and false imprisonment); Martin v. Mansfield, 3 Mass.
419 (1807) (trespass); Thurston v. Little, 3 Mass. 429 (1807) (trespass); Capen
v. Glover, 4 Mass. 305 (1808) (trespass); Pease v. Whitney, 5 Mass. 380 (1809)
(trespass); Agry v. Young, 11 Mass. 220 (1814) (pleading decision holding trespass
is proper action and not case)); New Hampshire (Johnson v. Dole, 4 N.H. 478
(1828) (trespass); Cloutman v. Pike, 7 N.H. 209 (1834) (trespass)); New Jersey
(Van Dien v. Hopper, 5 N.J.L. 764 (1820) (trespass)); New York (Saunders v.
Springsteen, 4 Wend. 429 (1830) (case); Wheeler v. Anthony, 10 Wend. 346
(1833) (trespass)); North Carolina (Sears v. West, 5 N.C. 291 (1809) (trespass);
Stewart v. Davis, 7 N.C. 244 (1819) (trespass)); Vermont (Bates v. Hazeltine,
242 23

243 77
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D. The Tax Collector in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not decide whether a tax or customs
official was liable in a common law action until 1836. When a case
did reach the Court, the nature of the dispute was slightly different
from that in most of the earlier cases; the common law action had
developed as a procedure to contest whether any tax liability existed
24
and not to contest the amount of the tax. Elliott v. Swartwout 6
was an action in assumpsit by an importer against the collector of
the Port of New York to recover an overpayment of duties. The
importer conceded that the goods were subject to duty but argued
that the correct rate was ten percent and not the fifty percent levied
by the collector. The opinion of the Court did not discuss the distinction in the earlier cases between collection of more than the
authorized amount and collection when no tax was due.24 7 The
Court relied on the earlier English and state precedents to establish
that the collector was personally subject to a common law action to
recover an excess of duties, if the taxpayer gave notice of the claim
of error at the time of payment. Thus the opinion recognized
greater common law liability than seems required by the earlier cases
and may have recognized a right to trial by jury in cases not included
in the original scope of the seventh amendment.
The Supreme Court adhered to the rule in Elliott v. Swartwout
for only nine years; in 1845 the Court reversed its position in Cary
v. Curtis 248 and held that a cause of action for an overpayment could
not be maintained against a collector. The stated reason for the
change in doctrine was an 1839 statute 249 that required the collector
to account immediately to the treasury for all duty collected. The
Court reasoned that because the collector could no longer hold the
money pending resolution of the action, it would be unfair to require the collector to refund money already paid into the treasury.
The Court emphasized that Elliott v. Swartwout was not controlling
because the 1839 statute had converted the tax collector from an
1 Vt. 81 (1828) (trespass); Waters v. Daines, 4 Vt 601 (1832) (trespass));
Virginia (See Kinney v. Beverley, 12 Va. 318 (1808) (argument of Attorney
General Nicholas and Randolph: "Where a man fails to pay his taxes, his personal
estate, it is admitted on all hands, is liable to be taken and sold without process.
...If the proceedings are irregular, he may bring a suit to recover it, and have
all the benefit of a trial by Jury." Id. 323-24)).
24635 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836).
247
1n Whitbread v. Brooksbank, 98 Eng. Rep. 970, 972 (K.B. 1774), Lord
Mansfield observed that an action for money had and received would not lie against
an officer of revenue for an overpayment unless the defendant consented to the suit.
24844 U.S. (3 How.) 235 (1845).
249Act of Mar. 3, 1839, c. 82, § 2, 5 Stat. 348 (1839).
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agent of the federal government into a conduit for tax revenues.250
Thus, the action in assumpsit for money had and received was no
longer available because this common law action would lie only
against an agent with the power to retain the funds he had collected
for the principal. The Court attempted to allay fears expressed by
the dissenting Justices by stating that "the answer to the assertion
. . . [that] the party is debarred all access to the courts of justice,
and left entirely at the mercy of an executive officer" 251 was that the
taxpayer could bring suit under other common law causes of action
such as replevin, detinue, and trover. This may be an inadequate
response to the constitutional concern because these other common
law writs all related to actions against one who had wrongfully taken
goods and not money. 252 Thus a person who paid his taxes in cash
might be excluded from a cause of action against the tax collector,
while an individual whose goods were taken might still be able to
bring an action. Cary can be read as establishing that there is no
constitutional requirement that a taxpayer be able to bring an
assumpsit action against a tax collector (whatever his relation to the
government) for either an overpayment or a payment when no tax
is due. Because the majority felt it could dispose of the case before it without explaining the constitutional issue, Cary should be
3
read today as limited to its facts-an action for overpayment25
25044

251

U.S. (3 How.) at 241-42.

Id. 250.

Trover lay for damages for the conversion of specific personal property,
where the plaintiff was entitled to the immediate possession thereof.
Detinue lay for the recovery of a specific chattel wrongly detained (or its
value-the option lying with the defendant), together with damages for
its detention. Replevin lay to recover specific personalty wrongfully taken
and detained, together with damages for its detention.
C. CLAru;, LAw OF CODE PLr.ADiNG 80 (2d ed. 1947).
253 The limited holding of Cary v. Curtis was recognized in DeLima v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 1 (1901). Even though Congress had attempted to make the administrative decision final and had attempted to exclude the possibility of a common
law action against the collector, note 267 infra, the Court held that in some cases
a taxpayer could still bring a common law action to recover duty paid under protest.
The dispute was not over the classification of the goods or the amount of 'duty;
the plaintiff insisted that the goods were not imported at all so that the collector
had no jurisdiction to assess any duty. The Court relied on Elliott v. Swartwout
to hold that the action was properly brought. Id. 174-80. The seventh amendment
was not discussed. See also In Re Fassett, 142 U.S. 479 (1892).
DeLima and Fassett have been distinguished in recent district and circuit court
opinions as applicable only to the particular statute involved. E.g., Argosy Limited
v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1968); Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210
(D. Me. 1974). See also cases cited id. 1216. Neither DeLima nor Fassett has
been overruled or limited by the Supreme Court, so both still affirm the vitality of
the common law action preserved by the seventh amendment. The recent opinions
do not discuss the seventh amendment issue, which cannot so easily be dismissed
as a "somewhat aged judicial antecedent." 404 F.2d at 17.
252
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The real problem in Cary v. Curtis is the mode of analysis
adopted by the Court-analysis that emphasizes fine distinctions
among the common law writs. It is the essence of the common law
rights that is important. It is difficult to believe that the drafters
of the seventh amendment sought to preserve the idiosyncracies of
the common law system of writs. It is much more likely that the
drafters were seeking to protect the fundamental rights that could
be culled from the common law system, such as the right to bring
suit against the collector of taxes, whatever the collector's relationship to the government. As Justice Story reminded the majority, the
"government itself is not suable at all." 254 It was therefore important to assure that citizens would have some means of redress against
the individual who acted for the government. The debates from
the ratification period show 25 that the right to a jury trial was
viewed as a means of protection against federal officials in federal
courts. Justice Story pointed out in his dissent in Cary:
[I]f Congress possess a constitutional authority to vest such
summary and final power of interpretation in an executive
functionary, I know no other subject within the reach of
legislation which may not be exclusively confided in the
same way to an executive functionary; nay, to the executive
himself. Can it be true that the American people ever
contemplated such a state of things as justifiable or practicable under our Constitution? I cannot bring my mind
to believe it .... 256
Justice McLean emphasized the absence of trial by jury: "The
danger is in sanctioning the principle. .

.

.

I object to it because

it is dangerous and may be ruinous. It takes from the citizen his
rights-rights secured to him by the Constitution; the trial by jury,
in a court of law." 257 The dissents of the two Justices did not convince their brethren,ss but they did find a receptive ear in Congress.
25444

255

U.S. (3 How.) at 256.
notes 213-27 supra.
U.S. (3 How.) at 253 (Story, J., dissenting).

See text

25644

accompanying

257 Id. 265-66

(McLean, J.,dissenting).

258 Justice Wayne dissented without an opinion, a fact not recorded by the
Reporter. MMUrnTs OF T=E SUPREEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs, Gary v. Curtis,

Tuesday, January 21, 1845. The division was therefore 4-3; the opinion by Justice
Daniel was supported only by Chief Justice Taney and Justices McKinley and

Catron.
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By the end of the next month Congress amended the statute interpreted by the Court 250 and expressly provided a right to a jury trial
260
in actions against the collector for refunds.
Customs duties do not directly affect the majority of citizens
today; internal revenue taxes are more important. The potential
common law liability of the collector was first recognized in an internal revenue case in City of Philadelphia v. Collector.2 61 The
issue in that case was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over
a removed action against the collector.262 In its discussion finding
jurisdiction, the Court stated that an action of assumpsit was the
appropriate remedy to recover taxes assessed illegally or erroneously 26 3 and cited Elliott v. Swartwout and the related opinion in
Bend v. Hoyt.264 Since then, the right to challenge federal tax liability in a common law civil action has remained firmly established;
in fact it is now so well established that the reason for it has been
Cart v. Curtis was decided on Jan. 21, 1845. Senator Huntington
259 Id.
first mentioned corrective legislation on Jan. 23. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d
Sess. 179 (1845). The bill was introduced on Jan. 27, with these remarks:
Mr. Huntington, on leave, introduced a bill explanatory of the act
making appropriation for the civil and diplomatic expenses of government
for the year 1839.
Mr. Huntington remarked that the judiciary had decided that the
provision of the law of 1839, which this bill was intended to explain, took
away the right of the importer to recover back moneys, or to try the question of right to recover back moneys, in any court of law or equity in any
State of the Union, paid as duties on goods to the collector, under protest;
and that this bill was intended to give the right to the importer to maintain action at law against the collector, or other person acting as collector,
to ascertain and try the legality and validity of the demand for the payment of duties on goods, wares, and merchandise which are not authorized
to be paid, in part or in whole, by law.
Mr. Woodbury remarked that the proviso of the law of 1839 alluded
to was not intended to bar the right of the importer to maintain a suit at
law for the recovery of duties illegally collected, but to prevent the money
thus collected from laying in the hands of the collector.
Mr. Huntington said that such he knew was the intention of the law,
and to give the power money illegally collected when that fact was
established.
Id. 195.
260 The Act was approved on Feb. 26, 1845, only five weeks after Cary v.
Curtis. Ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727 (1845).
26172 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 731-33 (1866). See also Erskine v. Van Arsdale,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 75, 77 (1872) ("Taxes illegally assessed and paid may always
be recovered back, if the collector understands from the payer that the taxes are
regarded as illegal and that suit will be instituted to compel the refunding of
them.").
26272 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 727-28.
263 Id. 731.
26438 (13 Pet.) 263 (1839). The defendant raised Cary v. Curtis as a defense, but the Court did not discuss the merits of the argument, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
at 732.
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forgotten. 265 This failure to recall the history of the action against
the collector has led some judges to erroneous conclusions. For
example, Justice Cardozo concluded that "[a] suit against a Collector
who has collected a tax in the fulfillment of a ministerial duty is
today an anomalous relic of bygone modes of thought." 266 A partial
explanation is that by 1933 the history behind Elliott v. Swartwout

and Cary v. Curtis had become less well known because Congress
had attempted to take away the right to a jury trial in customs cases
by providing an exclusive statutory procedure for challenging cus2 7
toms determinations.
Today, federal taxes raise much more revenue and affect many
more citizens more often than do customs duties. The effect of the
seventh amendment on tax refund suits has been discussed very little

recently. Constitutional analysis has been unnecessary for a quarter
century because the right to a jury trial has been statutorily guaran-

teed since 1954, if the taxpayer pays the tax and sues for a refund in
district court.268 The relevant congressional hearings and reports
trace the right to a jury trial to the common law precedents discussed in Elliott v. Swartwout 269 and make clear that the 1954 statute
26 5

For example, the earliest twentieth century opinion discussed the right to
jury trial only in a brief paragraph of dictum that concluded without careful
analysis that "the right . . . to a jury [in a suit against the collector] is not
to be found in the Seventh Amendment and the Constitution but merely arises by
implication from the provisions of § 3226, Revised Statutes, which has reference to
a suit at law." Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 105 (1927). Later opinions
repeated the dictum and enhanced the apparent authority of the conclusion, but
again there was little analysis of the history of the action against the tax collector.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 599 n.9 (1931).
266 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 382 (1933).
267

The Act of Feb. 26, 1845, c. 22, 5 Stat 727 became § 3011 of the Revised
Statutes of 1873. That section was repealed in 1890. Act to simplify the laws in
relation to the collection of the revenues, ch. 407, § 29, 26 Stat. 141-42 (1890).
At the same time Congress made the administrative decision final, id. at § 13, 26
Stat. at 136-37, unless review was sought in the circuit court, id. at § 15, 26 Stat
at 138, and declared that the collector was not liable to an ordinary civil action,
id. at § 25, 26 Stat at 141. The Supreme Court held that the statutory procedure
was exclusive, and that the circuit courts had no jurisdiction to hear a common
law action against the collector if the goods were actually imported and concededly
subject to some duty. Schoenfeld v. Hendrichs, 152 U.S. 691 (1894); Arnson v.
Murphy, 109 U.S. 238 (1883). It was still possible to bring some common law
actions. See note 253 supra.
26828 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970). The jury trial provision was added by Act of
July 30, 1954, ch. 648, § 2(a), 68 Stat 589.
269 "[N~o one has seriously suggested that the right to a trial by jury be denied
entirely. It has been retained in the form of a suit against the collector. That,
incidentally, cannot be constitutionally denied the taxpayer, as I understand constitutional law." Civil Actions in District Courts to Recover Taxes: Hearings on
S.252 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st
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was a reaffirmation of the common law liability of the tax collector
recognized by the Supreme Court in 1836.270 In 1966 Congress provided that suits for tax refunds in the district court must be brought
against the United States; 271 if the taxpayer sues the collection
officer, the United States must be substituted as the defendant. 27
This change in the caption of the suit may make the historical link
with the common law precedents less obvious, but the seventh
amendment would still guarantee a jury trial in such actions if the
Sess. 3 (1953)
Department).

(statement of Elbert P. Tuttle, General Counsel of Treasury

Suits Against the Director
The right to bring suit against one who illegally assesses a tax is not
created by any statutory provision but derives from the common law,
where it was a well-established principle that a person unlawfully exacting
a sum from another could not avoid liability merely by showing that he
had paid the moneys over to a third person. This rule of law, as applied
to collectors of taxes, received early affirmation in the Federal courts of
the United States.
In Elliott v. Swartwout [10 Peters 137 (1836)], it was held that,
where duties were paid under protest to the collector that they were too
high, an action would thereafter lie to recoup the amount erroneously
obtained. The Supreme Court cited as authority for this ruling, inter alia,
the following: Irving v. Wilson, 4 T.R. 485 (1791); Greenway v. Hurd,
4 T.R. 554 (1792); Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1984 (1766); Snowdon v.
Davis, 1 Taunt. 359 (1808); Clinton v. Strong, 9 Johns. 370 (1812);
Hearsey v. Pruyn, 7 Johns. 179 (1810); and Frye v. Lockwood, 4 Cow.
454 (1825).
In Erskine v. Van Arsdae, [15 Wall. 75 (1872)], the Supreme Court
summarized the rule as it then existed as follows:
Taxes illegally assessed and paid may always be recovered back, if
the collector understands from the payer that the taxes are regarded
as illegal and that suit will be instituted to compel the refunding of
them (p. 77).
For all practical purposes, the proceeding against the collector is now
a virtual fiction, for in those instances in which the collector or director as
he is now called, has lawfully acted within his official capacity, the United
States is the real party in interest and has assumed full liability. The
artificial nature of the suit against the collector was recognized at an early
date when the Federal Government, by statute, expressly provided that
moneys recovered in an action against the collector for taxes exacted by
him during the performance of his official duties would be paid out of the
United States Treasury. [Rev. Stat. § 989 (Mar. 3, 1863); 28 U.S.C.
20061.
There are two important considerations relating to personal suits
against the director to recover taxes. The first, as noted before, is that
this is the only remedy for obtaining redress against an overassessment in
which a jury trial may be had.
H.R. arE. No. 662, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1953).
See also H.R. BEP. No. 659, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 n.4 (1953) ("This right of
action derives from the common law."), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE CoNrG. &
AD. NEws 2716, 2717 n.4.
270S. PRop. No. 115, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953) ("This bill gives no new
substantive rights to the taxpayers .
271 I... § 7422(f) (1).
272Id.

§ 7422(f) (2).
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United States Code did not. The 1966 statute was not an attempt
by Congress to restrict the seventh amendment right to a jury; the
seventh amendment issue was not discussed in the congressional
2 78
reports.
The common law preserved by the seventh amendment begins
with the Case of the Marshalseaand spans the two centuries during
which the common law courts in England expanded their jurisdiction to control the officers of the government. The common law of
this period, including that of 1791, clearly recognized the right of a
taxpayer to a jury trial in an action against the collector. Therefore, the precedents do not support the conclusion of Justice White
in Atlas that "taxes may constitutionally be assessed and collected
.. with the relevant facts in some instances being adjudicated
only by an administrative agency." 274 The seventh amendment preserves the substance of these common law rights, not just the form
of the writs. Thus the amendment guarantees that a taxpayer may
obtain a civil jury trial to determine whether the alleged tax is owed
in an action brought to recover a tax after it has been paid to the
collector. The constitutional right to a jury trial to contest the
amount of tax due may be open to question, but the right to contest
the basic liability for tax is preserved by the seventh amendment.

IV. TnE

FUTURE DIREcTrON OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT DEBATE

The attempt in Atlas to carve out a new exception to the
seventh amendment to permit administrative factfinding in public
rights cases poses a serious threat to a fundamental guarantee of the
Bill of Rights. A forthright attack on the seventh amendment has
replaced the "silent approaches and slight deviations" 275 of the past.
278 See H.R. REP. No. 1915, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1966);

S. REP. No.

1625, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3676, 3681-82. The United States was required as the named defendant instead
of the actual collector because the 1966 legislation also required that all tax returns
be filed with one of the seven regional service centers, and not with one of the 58
district director's offices.

An action against the director of the service center could

be brought only in the district where the director resided because of venue requirements, a rule which would concentrate tax actions in only seven federal courts and
inconvenience to taxpayers forced to sue outside their home state. Instead of
keeping the suit against the collector and amending the venue statute, Congress
made the United States the named defendant so that the action could be brought
where the taxpayer resided. The change was not described as an attempt to overrule the seventh amendment, but as "minor amendments designed to serve taxpayer
convenience and preserve jurisdictional rules that are favorable to taxpayers in tax
litigation." 112 CONG. REc. 21,788 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Byrnes).
274 430 U.S. at 450.
275 United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
[Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
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Notwithstanding the asserted conclusion of Atlas that the Court will
prevent Congress from making inroads into the seventh amendment,276 there exists no standard to judge whether Congress has gone

too far once the Court abandons the firm lessons of history. Precedent cannot provide any further content to the rule stated in Atlas
because the rule is contrary to the common law precedents. Congress and the Court have tampered with the firm protection of the
seventh amendment in the hope that an administrative agency will
be better able than a court and jury to provide "speedy and expert
resolutions of the issues involved." 277 The historical parallel is
obvious but ignored by both Congress and the Court: the same
demand for efficiency by the Crown resulted in the expansion of the
admiralty courts in the colonies, a method for avoiding the common
law jury so objectionable that it was a declared reason for revolu2 78

tion.

The seventh amendment was added to the Constitution to preserve the common law right as fully as possible and to ensure that
any future Congresses would be "rendered . . . powerless . . . to

create new rights and remedies by statute and commit their enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court of law-such as an
administrative agency-in which facts are not found by juries." 279
The seventh amendment does not forbid the creation of administrative agencies; agencies that do not act in the nature of a common
law court are outside the scope of the amendment. 280 The seventh
amendment does not bar administrative factfinding even in matters
similar to actions at common law; 281 the amendment only guarantees that the common law jury will be able to perform its historic
function. Whether a modem procedure establishes a court, board,
or agency that is a substitute for a common law court, and whether
the common law jury had any historic function in such matters canThis can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy,
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon.
Id.
430 U.S. at 461 n.16.
Id. 461.
7 "For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury.
Declaration of Independence.
279 430 U.S. at 460.
280 See notes 137-40 supra & accompanying text.
281 See note 286 infra.
276

277
2 8
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not be correctly determined by looking only at modern dicta that
gloss over established distinctions. Every historical exception to the
seventh amendment listed in Atlas-equity, admiralty, tax collection,
military justice, and condemnation 2sA-is an exception grounded in
the specific history of each action at common law. As a group, these
actions constitute simply a collection of discrete categories and not
a public rights exception. The absence of such an exception compels the conclusion that Atlas was incorrectly decided. The only
procedure that would comply with the seventh amendment would be
enforcement by de novo civil action in a state or federal court.
The Supreme Court has not ruled an end to the debate over the
application of the seventh amendment to the OSHA procedure and
others similar to it. The Atlas opinion sets forth the strongest argument that can be made for excluding the jury, but the Court did
not foreclose the possibility that further evidence could require
reconsideration of the application of the seventh amendment to
OSHA or similar procedures.2 83 Two possible avenues for reconsideration are open on issues not decided in Atlas: (1) whether the
OSHA procedure violates article III of the Constitution by assigning judicial power to a body that is not a court; and (2) whether the
defendant can obtain a civil jury trial by paying the penalty assessed
by OSHA and bringing an action for a refund.
The objection that the OSHA procedure violates the separation
of powers doctrine because the agency is not a court under article
III was the first issue stated in the petitions for certiorari filed by
Atlas and Irey. Although it may be difficult to separate the article
III and seventh amendment issues, the Court did so by limiting its
grant of certiorari to the seventh amendment question. It is therefore still open to the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court to
decide whether an agency can be given the adjudicatory power that
Atlas approved without giving judicial power to a body other than
an article III court.2s4 Full discussion of the article III issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but many of the same cases that provide the history of the seventh amendment also supply the history
for article III. Those agencies or executive officers who were allowed
to find facts without a jury were either not acting in the nature of
282Id. 458.
On condemnation actions, see 5 MooRE's FEDEAL PRACTICE
ff 38.31[l], at 233 (2d ed. 1977). On military justice, see id. fr38.08[5], at 70 &
n.50; H. MonER, JusTincE
ThE MnrrAY 499 (1972).
283 See 430 U.S. at 461 n.16.
284 The courts of appeals have not yet read Atlas as an invitation to reopen
the article III question. See, e.g., Penn Dixie Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm'n, 553 F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1977); Dorey Elec. Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Cornm'n, 553 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1977).
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the common law courts (as in determining claims against the government) or, if acting in the nature of common law courts (as in determining how much was owed the government), were assessing taxes or
duties. If the historic distinctions are observed, there is no precedent
that would allow an administrative agency such as OSHRC to exercise the kind of adjudicatory power that Atlas implied had been
given to the agency.
Although it may be unlikely that the Court ill soon reexamine
the same seventh amendment arguments presented in Atlas, the
second avenue for reconsideration is open because the court in Atlas
did not decide whether absence of the jury from factfinding in the
first instance means that the jury is not required at any stage. Thus,
it may be possible for an employer to obtain a civil jury trial by
paying the OSHA penalty and bringing suit for a refund in federal
district court. If the administrative procedure for enforcing OSHA
determinations satisfies the seventh amendment only because OSHA
civil penalties are analogous to taxes, then the OSHA penalties must
also be subject to challenge in the same manner as taxes. This
would allow the OSHRC to determine violations initially, just as
the Internal Revenue Service has the unquestioned power in the
first instance to find the facts administratively that establish the
existence and amount of tax liability.
Under this procedure, employers charged with a violation of
OSHA would have two alternative methods of obtaining review.
Of course, the employer could use existing statutory review in the
court of appeals; this would be the only method available if the
employer does not want to pay the penalty in advance, but it would
not allow a jury trial. Instead of seeking statutory review in the
court of appeals, the employer could pay the assessed penalty and
file an action against the Secretary of Labor for a refund. 2 85 Such
an action would be a civil action for which the seventh amendment
would guarantee a right to a jury trial. The only issue would be
the factual question whether a violation had occurred and the
amount of the penalty would not be open to relitigation. 2 6 A finding that no violation occurred would be a determination that the
Secretary and Commission had exceeded their jurisdiction in de285 Civil penalties are to be paid to the Secretary for deposit into the Treasury
of the United States. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1970).
286 Most other federal agencies can collect civil penalties or forfeitures only by
a de novo action in the federal district court; in such cases the federal courts have
held that there is no right to a jury trial on the amount of the forfeiture. See, e.g.,
United States v. Duffy, 550 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1977) (under Federal Aviation Act)
(no discussion of seventh amendment).
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A finding that a violation had occurred

would sustain the jurisdiction of the Secretary and Commission and
deny the employer a refund.
The similarity between the two methods of review for tax cases
and the two suggested methods of review for OSHA cases is not
accidental, for it is only the tax collection precedent that supports
the Atlas exception to the seventh amendment right to jury trial.
Congress cannot eliminate the opportunity to bring a refund action,
as it cannot expand the nonjury exceptions beyond their reasonable
limits, to the exclusion and at the expense of the right to jury trial.
Atlas, Pernell, and Curtis all imply that Justices White and
Marshall continue to explore tentatively the extent to which
administrative agencies can be given power to adjudicate cases without violating the seventh amendment. The argument that the
language of the seventh amendment permits creation of the procedure in OSHA is not supported by "history and our cases." 288
The only reason given for such an assault on the amendment is
concern over crowded federal courts 29- "the tyrant's plea of the
necessity of unlimited powers in works of evident utility to the
public." 290 The work of the drafters of the Constitution and Bill
of Rights should not be so lightly cast aside. They could not foresee
how the new federal government would grow or how powerful it
would become, but they were fearful of creating a national government that would reinstitute the abuses against which they had rebelled. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights provided for the
separation of powers, limited judicial power to the courts, and as far
as possible provided the protection of a civil jury. Congress may
use its constitutional powers to expand the reach of the federal
government and to create federal agencies more powerful than ever
287 This Article has been limited to examining the history of the seventh
amendment and the earlier opinions to determine if Atlas correctly determined that
the seventh amendment did not apply. Once it is clear that there is a constitutional
right to a civil jury trial, the question how the administrative determination and
the civil jury trial should be related becomes important. What issues can be finally
determined by the agency, what is open for relitigation in the trial court, and how
the employer can obtain or waive rights are questions involving the murky area of
res judicata and collateral estoppel of agency findings in later civil litigation. Under
the classic doctrine the issue whether the Commission has jurisdiction to impose a
penalty-which depends on whether a violation has occurred-would be open to
full relitigation in court with no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect given to
the agency finding of a violation. See REsTATEMrNT oF JuDGAENTs § 10 (1942).
288 430 U.S. at 460.
289 Id. 455.
2903 W. BLAcKSTONE, Com _amramnius 74 (4th ed. 1770). Blackstone thus
characterized the claim of the privy council that the sewer commissions could not
be controlled by King's Bench, a claim Lord Coke and the common law lawyers
finally defeated. See text accompanying notes 190-92 supra.
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imagined in 1789, but Congress cannot escape from the limitations
of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. 291 If Congress wants increased federal adjudication in additional areas, Congress must provide more federal trial courts in which federal judges and civil juries
may hear these suits at common law. Any less respect for the seventh
amendment, as Atlas so dangerously invites, is a breach of faith.
29
1A jury could have competently determined whether a violation had occurred in Atlas or in Irey. No matter how complicated the safety rules may become,
in the end they must be understood and followed by employees such as the roofer
in Atlas and the pipe layer and construction superintendent in Irey. The expert
testimony in such cases ought to be as understandable as in product liability or
automobile accident cases.
The hostility toward the jury reflected in Atlas illustrates again a warning
Professor Wolfram wrote which deserves repeating because too many judges are
impatient with the civil jury:
[Tlhe constitutional values represented by the seventh amendment are
at a low state of importance in the minds of some, perhaps many,
scholars.... The obvious implication ... is that the seventh amendment
jury in civil cases is such a drag on efficient judicial administration . . .
and results in such inflated damage awards .. . that it should be avoided
. . . except where the seventh amendment, rather narrowly conceived,
compels otherwise.
I cite this particular instance, not as pathological, but as typical of an
attitude that must often color the perception and resolution of seventh
amendment issues. Judges are not immune from the problem. See, e.g.,
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 544-45 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
It is submitted that this is, at the least, rather unusual constitutionalism.
The idea of rejecting the underlying values of a constitutional guarantee,
or of viewing the guarantee as burdensome and thus to be restricted-if
applied to other portions of the Bill of Rights-would certainly be rejected.
Wolfram, supra note 10, at 648-49 n.33.

